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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
This Report summarises the results of a high
level technology study undertaken by CAENZ
into the implementation of public alerting
applications on the New Zealand telecommuni-
cations network infrastructure.
This study was commissioned by the Ministry
for Civil Defence and Emergency Management
(MCDEM) in response to requests by regional
Civil Defence and Emergency Management
(CDEM) Groups for central government guid-
ance towards the development of a National
Public Alerting System.
The objective of the study was to assess the
potential constraints and barriers to the
implementation of a number of identified
public alerting technologies on specific New
Zealand telecommunications networks; and to
suggest potential pathways forward.
Key Findings
1. The supporting telecommunications
infrastructure for implementing a public
alerting system is largely (if conditionally)
in place in New Zealand, and a wide range
of telecommunications based public
alerting applications are also available,
primarily from overseas vendors.
2. However, a number of technical constraints
were identified that could impact on the
implementation process, including:
constraints on the availability of technical
expertise amongst and within the tel-
ecommunications carriers due to existing
network rollout commitments to govern-
ment; and reduced network functionality
for alerting applications as a result of
historical business decisions or perceived
lack of market for services with potential
public alerting applications, such as Cell
Broadcasting.
3. Additionally, implementation of a national
public alerting system will also require
significant investment, the active coopera-
tion of the telecommunications carriers and
regulatory changes to address the privacy
issues around a national address database,
which will be central to the effectiveness of
a telecommunications based public alerting
system.
4. Choosing to implement an opt-in telecom-
munications based public alerting system
could accelerate the implementation
timetable by negating the need for signifi-
cant regulatory changes, compared to an
opt-out or compulsory system. However,
participation rates for opt-in systems were
found to be relatively low.
5. Public alert systems delivered across both
mobile and fixed lines networks were found
to complement each other in terms of
‘optimal alert windows’; i.e. alerts on
mobiles are more effective during waking
hours and vice versa for fixed line phones.
6. While the study identified that both mobile
and fixed line networks can be prone to
localised congestion, mechanisms are
available to mitigate their impact, including
congestion control and traffic prioritisation
tools or splitting lines across different
exchanges. These mechanisms are being
installed at the carriers’ discretion.
7. For mobile networks, SMS with geo-
location was identified as the most optimal
mechanism currently available to deliver
localised alerts. While Cell Broadcasting is a
technically superior mobile network
technology as it is less vulnerable to
congestion compared to SMS, it will require
significant investment to be deployed in
New Zealand.
8. Overall, telecommunications based public
alert systems should be considered as part
of a wider, multi-layer emergency warning
system as public alert systems share the
vulnerabilities and interdependencies of the
underlying telecommunications infrastruc-
ture.
Recommendations
1. The development of an overarching
national “public alerting architecture” or
public alerting systems framework should
be undertaken before the selection of
“public alerting technology applications” or
systems. The public alerting framework
should be standards based and suffi-
ciently open and flexible (i.e. platform
agnostic) to allow the integration of
Common Alert Protocol (CAP) capable
public alerting applications.
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2. An open, CAP capable telecommunications
based public alerting system will provide
financial and operational benefits due to
interoperability and use of common
protocols, while allowing the selection of
alerting applications to meet specific
regional, technical or fiscal requirements.
The failure to develop a robust Public
Alerting Framework may result in ad-hoc
deployments of alerting systems that are
not interoperable, and cannot be easily
integrated; which, for example, may require
an agency to generate multiple alerts - one
for each alerting technology in use (e.g.
landline, SMS). Conversely, a multi-mode
alerting system which utilises a single
interface to send alerts may not allow the
addition of other systems to the manage-
ment interface.
An alternative to having one fixed line
number dataset for the alerting system
would be to allow all telecommunications
carriers to maintain and control their own
customer database that integrates with a
CAP capable user interface for CDEM. This
has the advantage that carriers would not
be required to share the information with
any other agency and would avoid the
requirement and massive expense associ-
ates with constructing and maintaining a
large national dataset and related issues
such as commercial sensitivity. This would
require telecommunication carriers to either
agree to be involved in the public alerting
system or for it to be mandated.
Finally, although establishing a nation-wide
alerting project is complex, it presents
significant local, regional and national
benefit. Without it, the likelihood of
individual regions being able to implement
an effective multifaceted local public
warning tool is low.
3. Further to the 2008 GNS Science Report
(SR2008-34) into non-telecommunications
based public alerting systems, a more in-
depth cost-benefit analysis should be
undertaken to identify the place of telecom-
munications based alerting systems in the
overall emergency management toolkit.
4. Should a rationale for the implementation
of a national telecommunications public
alerting framework be established, a
number of parallel workstreams could be
undertaken in conjunction with, or in
parallel to, the development of the frame-
work. They include:
a. A further assessment of the required
legislative / regulatory changes to
address the privacy issues around the
development and operationalisation of
centralised and distributed address-
telephone number databases;
b. Developing a whole-of-government
approach towards identifying user
requirements for ownership and use of
information in the National Address
Register; allocation of costs; ensuring
alignment with government IT stand-
ards, and other issues; and
c. Engagement with telecommunications
carriers to identify protocols and
constraints to the implementation of
the public alert applications across their
networks.
5. Finally, one applicable analogue for a
suitable partnership between government
and the telecommunications carriers to
advance the development of a national
Public Alerting System may be Research
and Education Advanced Network New
Zealand Limited (REANNZ), a Crown-owned
company set up to establish, implement,
own and operate the high-speed nation-
wide Kiwi Advanced Research and Educa-
tion Network (KAREN) telecommunications
network for the research and education
sectors. One of its key objectives is to
facilitate participation by multiple telecom-
munications sector partners so as to ensure
the greatest possible flexibility for ongoing
evolution. This objective applies equally to
the development of a national telecommu-
nications based Public Alerting System.
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GLOSSARY
Access network Base station/cell-site equipment layer
AUC Authentication Centre
A-GPS Assisted GPS
BTS Base Transceiver Station
BSC Base Station Controller
CAP Common Alerting Protocol
CDMA CDMA (Code-Division Multiple Access) is a type of mobile telephony network
that allows analogue to digital conversion so that it can be transmitted over
the air. It is a form of multiplexing, which allows numerous signals to occupy
a single transmission channel, optimising the use of available bandwidth.
The technology is used in ultra-high-frequency (UHF) cellular telephone
systems in the 800-MHz and 1.9-GHz bands.
Device Or mobile device, mobile handset, mobile phone – a portable telephone
powered by batteries
DSL Digital Subscriber Line
EDGE Enhanced Data Rates for GSM Evolution
EDR Enhanced Data Rate
EGNOS European Geostationary Navigation Overlay Service
FM Frequency Modulation
GMSC Gateway Mobile Switching Centre is the MSC that determines which visited
MSC the subscriber who is being called is currently located. It also interfaces
with the Public Switched Telephone Network. Some manufacturers place the
gateway function in the MSC therefore a dedicated GMSC isn’t always
required.
GPRS General Packet Radio Service
GPS Global Positioning System
GSM GSM (Global System for Mobile communication) is a digital mobile telephony
system that is widely used throughout world. GSM uses a variation of time
division multiple access (TDMA) and is the most widely used of the three
digital wireless telephony technologies (TDMA, GSM, and CDMA). GSM
digitises and compresses data, then sends it down a channel with two other
streams of user data, each in its own time slot. It operates at either the 900
MHz or 1800 MHz frequency band.
HLR Home Location Register is a central database that contains details of each
mobile phone subscriber that is authorized to use the core network
HSPDA High-Speed Downlink Packet Access
HTML HyperText Markup Language
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ICE In Case of Emergency
IP Internet Protocol
ISP Internet Service Provider
LBS Location Based Service
MSAS Multi-functional Satellite Augmentation System
MUA Mail User Agent
MSC Mobile Switching Centre is the primary service delivery node for mobile
networks. The MSC sets up and releases the end-to-end connection, handles
mobility and hand-over requirements during the call and takes care of
charging and account monitoring.
PSTN Public Switched Telephone Network
RNC Radio Network Controller
SBAS Satellite Based Augmentation System
SMSC A short message service centre (SMSC) is the portion of a wireless network
that handles SMS operations, such as routing, forwarding and storing
incoming text messages on their way to desired endpoints.
TCF Telecommunication Carriers’ Forum
TEPF Telecommunication Emergency Planning Forum
TDD Telecommunication Device for the Deaf
TSP Telecommunications Service Provider
TTY Teletype/Teletypewriter
Transmission
(Mobile Network) The transport mechanism that links mobile cell sites together. This can be
done by Fibre-optic or copper cable or microwave radio.
UMTS UMTS (Universal Mobile Telecommunications Service) is a third-generation
(3G) broadband, packet-based transmission of text, digitised voice, video,
and multimedia at data rates up to 2 megabits per second (Mbps). UMTS is
based on the Global System for Mobile (GSM) communication standard.
UMTS uses WCDMA technology, and the two terms are often used inter
changeably with each other.
VLR Visitor Location Register is a central database of mobile users from other
networks that are roaming on a carrier’s network.
W-CDMA WCDMA (Wideband Code Division Multiple Access) is a third-generation (3G)
wireless standard which utilizes one 5 MHz channel for both voice and data,
offering high speed data transfer.  It is the type of mobile networks that a
large number of telecommunication carriers are moving to as it is more
advanced than both CDMA and GSM.
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1  INTRODUCTION
The New Zealand Centre for Advanced Engi-
neering (CAENZ) has been commissioned by
the Ministry for Civil Defence & Emergency
Management (MCDEM) to undertake a high-
level review into the capabilities of telecommu-
nications technologies in New Zealand that
may be used for the purpose of Public Alerts or
Warnings, either prior to, or during the course
of a National Emergency. It has been prepared
in conjunction with a MCDEM contracted review
of all public alerting options (GNS Science
Report, SR2008-34).
This Report summarises the results of the study
and is intended to provide the Ministry with:
• a review of both public alerting technology
applications currently available, and the
New Zealand fixed line and mobile telecom-
munications networks;
• an understanding of the opportunities,
constraints and enablers that might impact
on the implementation of public alerting
technology applications on the New
Zealand telecommunications networks; and
• recommended criteria for the selection and
evaluation of public alerting technology
options; and a recommended framework for
an optimal, telecommunications based,
National Public Alerting System.
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2  PROJECT SCOPE AND METHODOLOGY
2.1 Scope
The aim of this study is to review telecommu-
nications based technologies that may be
applicable for public alert systems. The study
has focused on public alerting systems that are
currently available and the New Zealand fixed
line and mobile telecommunications networks.
The study is intended to describe the:
• Capability of the New Zealand telecommuni-
cations infrastructure to send public alerts.
• Details of the range of public alerting
technology applications currently available
in New Zealand and overseas and their
ability to be deployed or implemented on
New Zealand fixed line and mobile networks.
• Features of public alerting technology
applications that may become available in
the future.
• Potential technical and engineering con-
straints that may impact on the deployment
of public alerting technology options on the
New Zealand telecommunications infrastruc-
ture, including a review of the parameters/
boundaries of the public alerting framework.
The following subjects were beyond the scope
of this report and have not been addressed:
• Human Factors – primarily the psychological
or behavioural characteristics and nuances
that must be considered when crafting
specific warning or public alert messages in
order to elicit the desired public responses
to the warnings. This study is concerned
solely with the technology options used to
deliver these messages.
• The National Warning System (NWS) – this
study is concerned with the technologies
that will deliver public alerts to the general
public from the CDEM sector, while the
NWS is intended to provide alerts to the
CDEM sector from MCDEM.
• Local or Regional Warning Systems – this
study has not taken specific regional
hazard requirements into consideration in
its assessment of applicable public alerting
technology applications.
• Non-telecommunications based Warning
Systems – non-telecommunications based
alerting tools such as sirens and radio and
television warning messages, are detailed
in An Evaluation and Decision Support Tool
for Public Notification Systems in New
Zealand (GNS Science Report, SR2008-34)1.
2.2 Methodology
The methodology for this study comprised:
1. Literature Review:
The literature review involved desk research
and personal telephone interviews with
New Zealand and overseas based vendors,
government agencies (e.g. Australian
Department of Justice) and industry
organisations.
The literature review examined the New
Zealand and international context for
emergency management; as well as
contemporary international experiences of,
and thinking on, telecommunications
networks based public alert systems. The
literature review also examined a number
of ‘market-ready’ and ‘near-to-market’
communication applications and system
technologies applicable to public alerting
(e.g. voice, SMS etc.), and also briefly
considered features of both public alerting
applications currently in development, and
emerging technologies, that might be
applicable to public alerting in the near
future.
2. Telecommunications Networks Review:
A series of personal interviews and two
workshops were held with representatives
from the New Zealand telecommunications
providers and industry organisations (e.g.
TCF, TEPF) with the aim of identifying
potential constraints and opportunities to
the implementation of public alerting
technology applications.
Feedback was sought from the telecommu-
nications providers on:
– potential technical constraints and
opportunities to implementation at a
network level;
1 Leonard, GS, Wright, K, Smith, WD and Johnston, DM,
2008. An Evaluation and Decision Making Support Tool
for Public Notification Systems in New Zealand, GNS
Science Report SR2008-34.
Page 12 NZ Telecommunications Based Public Alerting Systems Technology Study
– potential policy, financial and other
constraints at a strategic level;
– preferences with respect to specific
public alerting applications and the
underlying rationale; and,
– recommendations on potential imple-
mentation pathways, timeframes and
scale of investment required.
A summary of applications is presented
with key features and vulnerabilities of
each current communication system,
including the underlying technology used
for routing communications.
Consideration was given to new integrated
systems identified in the literature review
that would combine web based tools with
fixed and mobile technology.
3. Components of Effective Telecommunication
based Public Alerting Systems:
Consideration is given to issues associated
with combining multiple communication
systems into an integrated public alerting
framework.
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3  LITERATURE REVIEW
The literature review examined the available
public alerting technologies and associated
technical capabilities and performance. The
literature also looked at overseas implementa-
tions of the technologies; and in particular, the
implementation strategies employed and
enabling factors present in different countries.
3.1 CDEM Context
New Zealand Context
Under the Civil Defence Emergency Manage-
ment (CDEM) Act 2002, MCDEM is responsible
for maintaining the National Warning System to
issue civil defence warnings received from
agencies noted as being responsible for
specified hazards. National warnings must be
provided by MCDEM to a range of agencies
including CDEM Groups and local authorities.
Regional CDEM Groups are responsible for
disseminating natioanl warnings to local
communities and maintaining local warning
systems. In practice, often the Regional CDEM
Groups delegate this responsibility to local
authorities.
Telecommunication carriers, however, are under
no legislative obligations to send warnings but
can be co-opted by the Emergency Services
(e.g. Fire Service, Police) in an emergency
situation to assist in the delivery of emergency
warnings.
This project has been undertaken partly in
response to requests to MCDEM from regional
CDEM Groups for a telecommunication based
alerting system to be implemented on a
national basis.
Increased interest in public alerting systems
has arisen due to recent overseas experiences
(e.g. Asian Tsunami and Hurricane Katrina); and
locally, to the Tongan earthquake tsunami scare
in Gisborne in 2007.
A nationalised approach to public alert systems
would potentially provide operational benefits
through the use of common and consistent
public alerting applications and financial
benefits through lower training costs and
economies of scale for equipment purchases.
This is particularly the case in the New Zealand
CDEM environment as the country may be too
small to integrate and support a multitude of
regional public alerting systems within a
national public alerting framework.
Recent investigations into public alerting
options within New Zealand at a regional level
have been reported in the following publica-
tions:
• “An evaluation and decision making
support tool for public notification systems
in New Zealand”2, a 2008 GNS Science
Report currently being prepared for publica-
tion.
• “Assessment of options of hazard warning
systems for the Gisborne district”3, 2007
GNS Science Report, which reviewed
current warning arrangements and devel-
oped a number of recommended options
for dissemination of warnings to communi-
ties in the Gisborne district.
• “Assessment of Auckland CDEM Group
warning system options”4, 2006 GNS
Science Report, which developed a number
of recommended options for the dissemina-
tion of CDEM warnings to potentially
affected businesses and communities in the
Auckland Region, so that an informed
decision could be made. It also assessed
New Zealand and overseas examples of
best practise warning systems.
International Context
Mass public alerting through telecommunica-
tions networks has recently been subject to
considerable international scrutiny. This is
primarily due to the occurrence of recent high-
profile natural hazard-based events such as the
2004 Boxing Day Tsunami and Hurricane
2 Leonard, GS, Wright, K, Smith, WD and Johnston, DM,
2008. An Evaluation and Decision Making Support Tool
for Public Notification Systems in New Zealand, GNS
Science Report SR2008-34.
3 Leonard, GS, Johnston, DM and Saunders, W, 2007.
Hazard Warning Systems for the Gisborne District:
Assessment of Options, GNS Science Report 2007/04 72p.
4 Leonard, GS, Johnston, DM, Saunders, W and Paton, D,
2006. Assessment of Auckland Civil Defence and
Emergency Management Group Warning System Options,
GNS Science Report 2006/002 79p.
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Katrina; and more recently, Hurricanes Gustav
and Ike. Each of these events highlighted the
need for appropriate, response-ready alerting
systems.
Media news stories on these events have
illustrated the role that mobile phones per-
formed as a means of both informal and
official alerting. The large uptake of mobile
phones globally, and the role they have played
during these recent events, highlight telecom-
munication networks as the starting point for
any assessment of public alerting systems
infrastructure.
National public alerting research projects are
currently underway in:
• Australia;
• European Union (funded by Netherlands
Government);
• USA (Gulf of Mexico states, New York City,
and Greater Houston);
• United Nations;
• United Kingdom;
• Sri Lanka;
• India;
• Thailand;
• Spain; and,
• Peru.
The United Nations agency for information and
communication technologies, the International
Telecommunications Union (ITU) has also been
quite active in this space. A key project of the
ITU currently underway is an investigation into
the standardisation of mobile telecommunica-
tion channels for use in cell-broadcasting, so
that there is consistency between countries on
which channels are reserved for alert mes-
sages. This will enable travellers who use cell
broadcasting to automatically receive alert
messages in other countries that use cell
broadcasting.
3.2 Public Alerting
Frameworks: Risks,
Vulnerabilities and
Interdependencies
Regardless of the public alerting technologies
selected, they are likely to share number of
common characteristics with the underlying
telecommunication networks, including:
a. Transmission and load factors
Any failure of network transmission assets will
affect the ability of any public alerting technol-
ogy application to send a public alert message.
For example, infrastructure loss can create
network congestion outside the areas that may
be directly impacted by the specific hazard
event.
Telecommunications networks are usually under
heavy load when a major event occurs. Sending
warning messages creates additional load, and
would likely generate subsequent loading as
individuals seek further official and informal
information. This loading increase may extend
nationally and could result in delays in further
message alerts being transmitted and received.
b. Optimal Alerting Windows
Speed of transmission of the alerts is subject
to the underlying network load activity. Optimal
speed is achievable in the period of lowest
activity, typically 12:00 midnight to 4:00 am.
Telecommunications based alerting has
greatest value during these sleeping hours
because a large proportion of the population
are not listening to standard broadcast media
during this time and the phone ringtones are
often capable of waking people up.
Warning messages through standard broadcast
media, such as radio and television, present
the greatest alerting reach during normal
waking hours, particularly at key news hours,
because a large proportion of the population
would either be listening or have access to it
during this time.
c. Public engagement and Education
A comprehensive public engagement and
education programme, including regular
exercises, is critical to ensuring the efficacy and
effectiveness of a public alerting system. For
example, establishing “message credibility” is
important to ensure the alerts are taken
seriously and result in the correct responses
being elicited to the warnings.
Messages sent over the telecommunications
network may be limited in length due to device
functionality and/or transmission technology.
Different communities may have different
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responses to similar messages5, therefore the
content of warning messages should be
cognisant of community profiles and should be
concise and/or direct the recipient to a source
of more detailed information.
d. Mandatory, Opt-out, and Opt-in solutions
Opt-in solutions generally do not provide
saturated coverage of the population, and
historically, this has been the case in New
Zealand. A proportion of the population,
usually the majority, for various reasons,
including privacy concerns, will not subscribe
to the opt-in service and will consequently be
excluded from the opt-in components of the
alerting system during an alert event. Appendix
1 (Opt-in System Supporting Calculations)
illustrates current opt-in statistics for opt-in
warning systems in effect in New Zealand.
Opt-in warnings also require greater start-up
and maintenance of public education pro-
grammes to support them than mandatory
options. Mandatory or opt-out solutions are
therefore preferable to opt-in solutions.
e. Alert Fatigue
Alerting for minor events may dilute responses
to warnings. Public alerting projects in the USA
have noted this6. Where the alert system was
an opt-in solution, individuals were more likely
to opt-out as a consequence of “alert fatigue”.
f. Alerting Frequency
Any alerting system should have the ability to
retransmit messages periodically because some
people may not have received the initial
message or may inadvertently move into the
target area during the emergency event.
g. Equipment Interface
Telecommunication based alerts must be
capable of dealing with a range of complexities
including answering machines, carrier based
add-on services (e.g. call waiting), and call
forwarding. A live test in Australia undertaken
by the Victorian Emergency Services Commis-
sioner encountered several peripheral based
issues caused by these complexities7; for
example, the auto-dialler function of the public
alert system that pushed pre-recorded alert
messages to fixed line phones wasn’t pro-
grammed to wait for the answer machine
message to complete, resulting in the answer
machine only recording part of the message.
Telecommunications technologies are also
subject to rapid change and telecommunication
carriers regularly replace large parts of their
networks to maintain pace with these advance-
ments. Consequently, any alerting system
application will need to be ‘platform agnostic’
and mandate a standards based approach in
order to maximise system flexibility and
resilience.
3.3 Integrated Public
Alerting Systems
Integrated alerting systems allow users to send
messages over a number of communication
methods (e.g. email, SMS, etc.) through a
single user interface.
However, New Zealand telecommunication
carriers do not currently have the capability to
easily send localised messages to mobile
devices. While this option is available (i.e.
hardware modules are available from system
vendors and third party application vendors), it
does not appear to have been included their
deployment plans for the near to medium term.
A number of market ready integrated public
alerting systems are currently available. An
initial review of available solutions was
performed and is included in Appendix 2
(Emerging Technologies). However, due to the
rapid pace of technology development, this
information is likely to date rapidly.
The review of integrated public alert systems,
although not exhaustive, has indicated that a
wide range of solutions with varying strengths
and weaknesses are available. However, it was
also apparent that the more comprehensive
systems (e.g. Cellcast & UMS) appear to be
from larger, overseas markets. More informa-
tion on these specific systems may be found in5 Betts, R, 2006. Community Information and Warning
System – The Report of the Trial and Evaluation, Report of
the Office of the Emergency Services Commissioner,
Department of Justice, Victorian Government, Australia 116p.
6 Martin, 2008. Commercial Mobile Alert System First Report
and Order, Federal Communications Commission Report,
Washington, DC, USA, p15.
7 Betts, R, 2006. Community Information and Warning
System – The Report of the Trial and Evaluation, Report of
the Office of the Emergency Services Commissioner,
Department of Justice, Victorian Government, Australia 116p.
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Appendix 3 (Non Opt-in Systems) and Appendix
4 (Partial and/or Opt-in Systems).
Common characteristics of integrated systems:
• Susceptible to the vulnerabilities of the
underlying telecommunication’s network
infrastructure especially speed.
• Cost and implementation timeframes
increase significantly with increased
functionality.
Integrated alerting systems provide advanced
functionalities such as:
• Area Manager interfaces that allow the
‘geo-targeting’ of alerts; i.e. polygons can
be defined within a GIS based system to
demarcate the area and the Area Manager
Interface communicates with carriers to
ensure messages are only sent to those
within the polygon.
• Interactive capabilities that allow the public
to respond to preset questions such as
acknowledging of message receipt and
requests for evacuation assistance.
• Congestion control and optimisation
mechanisms that aid in assuring delivery
speed and throughput.
• Predefined messages for a variety of events.
• Highly accurate databases that provide up-
to-date numbers and location data.
• Multi-mode delivery.
• Delivery success measurement (real time
and by report).
• Tight coupling of application and technology.
• Location based services for enabling in/out
of zone reporting and re-messaging.
• Automated dialling utilising many lines or
ports.
• System security and access control.
Integrated Public Alerting System
options
The following systems were reviewed due
either to the advanced functionality they are
able to provide or the current interest in them
from New Zealand CDEM Groups.
Non-opt-in Partial and/or opt-in
integrated public integrated public
alerting solutions alerting solutions
• CellCast • OPTn
• CIWS • Whispir
• UMS Population
Alert System
These systems are summarised in Appendices 3
(Non Opt-in Systems) and 4 (Partial and/or Opt-
in Systems) and require further detailed
investigation to determine their applicability to
the Ministry’s requirements.
3.4 International
Implementations of Public
Alerting Systems
Internationally, the implementation of public
alerting system capabilities by telecommunica-
tions carriers have been supported by a variety
of measures, including legislation, contractual
agreements and compensation mechanisms.
Table 1 summarises these measures by country.
The UK, Australia and New Zealand are coun-
tries which do not currently have legislative
measures in place to support the implementa-
tion of public alert systems.
Despite the low number of countries involved
in the GSM Association’s study (see Table 1), it
appears that the telecommunications carriers
have participated voluntarily in public alerting
initiatives.
Europe
The Netherlands was the first country to
implement a government sponsored cell
broadcasting system which demonstrated
strong partnerships between the private sector
carriers and government8. This partnership is
also providing significant support to an EU
project on cell broadcasting.
In addition to cell broadcasting, the Nether-
lands uses a feature of radio broadcasting to
provide messages (such as traffic updates) via
the space on radio displays that carries the
station ID to deliver alert messages.
Italy has requirements beyond public alerting.
Carriers are required to identify Italian citizens
8 2004. Dutch Government plans mobile alert system based
on cell broadcast technology. Publictechnology.net. http://
www.publictechnology.net/modules.php?op=
modload&name=News&file=article&sid=1604 and 2006.
U.S. Officials Observe as Dutch Test Emergency Cell Phone
Alert. Officer.com. http://www.officer.com/article/
article.jsp?id=32475&siteSection=8
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in a foreign country affected by a natural
disaster, contact them via a text message with
a set of questions, receive and collate the
responses, and provide a report to their
government.
Australia
‘Public alerting’ has received a high profile in
Australia in 2008, with the Australian Prime
Minister and State Premiers supporting a mass
public alerting project intended to be operational
next year. This system is expected to provide a
similar level of functionality to the CIWS system
tested by the Victoria Government10.
Japan
Japan is planning to use normal ‘Cell Broad-
cast’ for warning and informing the public for
emergencies, but is also investigating a
special, additional signal in the ‘Paging
Channel’ for earthquake and tsunami warnings.
Japan’s tsunami risk necessitates messages to
be sent very rapidly. The paging channel can
sound a special alert tone to all customers
within 20 seconds to indicate an imminent
tsunami. In contrast, cell broadcasting will take
between 20 seconds and 2 minutes.
Japan does not run a 3G network compatible to
the New Zealand 3G networks but this is a
technology that could be of value in the future.
United States of America
The state of Wisconsin has implemented a cell
broadcasting based alerting system since 2005.
3.5 Emerging Mobile
Technologies with Alerting
Applications
Advancing capabilities are presenting new
opportunities beyond those of a traditional
mobile phone. Internationally there are several
alerting services that provide insight to future
possible directions for public alerting with
intelligent mobile devices.
Emerging Applications
During the Literature Review, three vendors
demonstrated custom applications that hinted
at the potential to produce rich applications
with alerting potential that build upon the
extensive technical capabilities that the newer
mobile devices provide.
Rave Wireless is an application designed for
campuses that incorporates a wide range of
applications including: course management,
course messaging, course polling, course
alerts, flashcards, streaming video, in-class
polling, group messaging, group polling, school
email, bus tracker, broadcast alerts and a
campus safety application.
SquareLoop is an alerting application that
receives all alerts sent using the SquareLoop
Table 1: Public Alerting System Implementation Mechanisms [source: GSMA. 20059]
Instrument Country Technology Carrier 
Participation 
Compensation 
Legislation Finland Any technology may be used Compulsory Some financial compensation 
Legislation and 
contractual 
agreement 
USA Probably SMS-based (but still to be determined) 
Proposed to 
be voluntary 
Possibility of 
government 
financing 
Contractual 
agreement Netherlands Cell broadcast Voluntary 
No financial 
compensation 
Contractual 
agreement Italy SMS Voluntary 
No financial 
compensation 
Contractual 
agreement Korea Cell broadcast Voluntary 
No financial 
compensation 
Oral agreement India SMS and cell broadcast simultaneously Voluntary 
No financial 
compensation 
Oral agreement Malaysia Cell broadcast Voluntary No financial compensation 
9 GSM Association, 2005. Report on Emergency Alerting and
Emergency Handling Initiatives, GSMA Report p19.
10 Betts, R, 2006. Community Information and Warning
System – The Report of the Trial and Evaluation, Report
of the Office of the Emergency Services Commissioner,
Department of Justice, Victorian Government, Australia
116p.
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technology, determines the location of the
phone to determine if the alert is relevant, and
if so display the alert to the user along with an
audible alert.
Zingerang is a suite of applications available
for desktops and mobile devices that allow
alerts to ‘travel’ from device to device for a
particular user. If no reply is received within a
certain timeframe then the system moves the
alert to the next device of the user. Zingerang
is currently under a trial of emergency notifica-
tions from California’s Emergency Information
Service (EDIS). These alerts are provided for
fire, earthquake, health, weather and other
events.
The number of text messages these systems
are capable of sending per minute would be
based on the number agreed with the telecom-
munication carriers. Maximum network rates of
the telecommunications carriers are discussed
in Appendix 6 (System Description).
Future Capabilities
The following are capabilities of mobile devices
that are currently available in the market. Over
time a greater percentage of devices will
support these and other advanced capabilities.
a. Support for a wide range of communica-
tions protocols
Devices capable of roaming to most global
cellular networks, can connect to the Internet
via a variety of protocols (both cellular and Wi-
Fi), share information locally via Bluetooth, and
determine location using GPS, e.g. recent
mobile devices from Apple and Nokia.11
b. Increasing computational ability and
programmability
Mobile devices are becoming increasingly
advanced, some are nearly as powerful as
typical computers, but are contained in an
ultra-portable profile. Custom applications for
these can be developed independently of the
mobile phone producers or network operators
creating both commercial and public good
opportunities.
c. Location-awareness
Many mobile devices now have Assisted GPS
(A-GPS) embedded in them. A-GPS provides the
United States Federal Communication Commis-
sion’s Enhanced 911 requirements to support
emergency services needs to locate mobile,
and more recently VoIP devices for emergency
calls to 911.
Assisted GPS works by utilising multiple means
of determining the location of the device (e.g.
cells sites, Wi-Fi nodes, GPS satellites). The
location information can be accessed by
software, so that in theory any application can
access the current location of the mobile device.
Devices that have cameras and are location-
aware may create further opportunities.
d. Increased Internet accessibility
The inclusion of mobile data protocols such as
GPRS, EDGE, HSDPA and Wi-Fi are enabling
mobile devices to connect to the Internet via
multiple methods. This has significant potential
not only as an information source during
emergencies, but also for interactive Internet-
enabled applications.
e. Push Communications
The Research in Motion Blackberry popularised
the use of ‘push’ communications in delivering
email to a mobile device. Push generally
ensures that messages are delivered quickly to
the mobile device. Push is being extended to
support the delivery of information other than
email including events, contacts, and instant
messages.
f. Using the Global Positioning System for
Public Alerting
The European Space Agency has suggested
modifications to the GPS system that would
allow the transmission of alerts via GPS
satellites. As more individuals have access to
GPS devices in their cars and phones, this is
likely to be a viable method for distributing
alerts that compliments any telecommunica-
tion-based alerting systems.
Unfortunately, this solution would be prohibi-
tively expensive for New Zealand to invest in
on our own due to the cost of launching a geo-
synchronous satellite required in order to
broadcast the augmented signal that could
carry alerts. It may be possible to implement a
regional solution – such as the South Pacific or
Oceania, or even a global solution. This
11 GSM 850/900/1800/1900, UMTS 850/1900/2100, GPRS,
EDGE, HSDPA, Wi-Fi 802.11 b & g, Bluetooth 2.0 + EDR,
Assisted GPS(A-GPS).
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approach is only conceptual at this stage, and
may take a number of years and international
debate to reach fruition.
Examples of the application of emerging
technologies in alerting are provided in
Appendix 2 (Emerging Technologies).
Other Potentially Customisable Mobile
Tools
The carriers were found to have some in-house
tools that could be adapted for use as compo-
nents of a nationwide public alerting tool:
a. Vodafone NZ Crisis Text Tool
Vodafone NZ has an SMS based web interface
system, used to alert its crisis team of issues.
This could be configured to give CDEM access.
Some customisation and installation would be
required and therefore a project would need to
be established. The key benefit of this tool
over standard SMS is that it is built to find the
quickest path to the end user. It is only viable
for up to 10,000 subscribers. It doesn’t rely on
the SMSC’s.
b. Vodafone NZ Marketing Text Tool
Vodafone NZ has developed an in-house tool
which is presently being used to send market-
ing messages to customers. It has a built-in
transmission throttling mechanism currently set
to 35 outbound texts per second.
It can import an unlimited number of sub-
scriber numbers in a variety of formats e.g. txt,
csv etc. It can also set an expiry date and if a
subscriber hasn’t received it within 2 hours, the
text message can be dumped.
It currently has a limited life and will need
additional development to extend it. This tool
could be used as a public alerting tool but has
not been built for this purpose.
c. Telecom eTXT and Vodafone web2TXT
eTXT™ sends text messages to a group of text
capable mobile phones simultaneously. Replies
can be sent back to the PC or mobile which
sent the message. Once set up, eTXT™ can be
used to send messages to groups or individu-
als from Outlook, a web browser, or from a
mobile phone.
d. Text Short-codes
Text short-codes are mobile SMS services
offered by Telecom, Vodafone NZ and their
third Party Service Providers. Short-codes are
used to send or receive text messages. A
variety of shortcode services are available,
such as Air New Zealand’s “TextExpress”
service. To use this service, a traveller texting a
flight number to ‘737’ (the service’s Text Short-
code) will receive a text back from the
TextExpress service with the latest flight arrival
and departure information.
e. Alert to NZ Citizens Overseas or Foreign
Citizens within New Zealand
In the event of an onshore incident, both
Vodafone NZ and Telecom NZ have the ability
to identify which overseas customers are
roaming on its networks and provide that
information to an authority such as MFAT.
Vodafone NZ stated it would take 1-8 hours
depending on how many Visitor Location
Registers (VLR’s) the country has, which
correlates to the number of cell users in the
country.
3.6 Legislative Constraints
and Support
A high level investigation of relevant codes and
legislation has provided insight into a number
of aspects relevant to the implementation of a
public alerting system.
In New Zealand, several legislative constraints
exist that will need to be addressed to enable
a national public alerting system to be imple-
mented. The majority of these constraints
relate to the creation and management of an
appropriate database to support the telecom-
munications based components of a public
alerting system.
Enabling Policies
New policies to facilitate the implementation of
a public alerting system will need to go
beyond the provisions of the CDEM Act 2002 to
ensure consistent message treatment, security
of information and compulsory compliance
across all telecommunications carriers in an
environment that avoids commercial disadvan-
tages to any individual carrier.
The Telecommunication Information Privacy
Code (2003) will be central to the process of
developing appropriate enabling policies, but
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other relevant legislation will include:
• Telecommunications Act 2001;
• Privacy Act 1993 No 28 (as at 01 August
2008), Public Act;
• Unsolicited Electronic Messages Act 2007;
• Telecommunication Carriers Forum Codes;
• Mobile Premium Messaging Services Code
2008;
• Telecommunications Information Privacy
Code 2003; and
• SMS Anti-Spam Code 2007.
Excerpts from these documents, with commen-
tary on relevant clauses, are included in
Appendix 5 (Relevant Legislation).
Summary of Specific Considerations
The following considerations will be relevant
for advancing a framework for public alerting:
• Privacy Act (1993) provisions may deem the
information that is kept for the public
number database as personal information
(Privacy Act).
• Each new telecommunications code must
have the support of 75% of TCF members
(TCF Codes);
• Establishing a new telecommunications
code may take several months with the
cumulative effect of code drafting, review-
ing, consultation, revising and ratification.
(TCF Codes).
• New, amended and revoked codes must be
publicly notified (TCF Codes).
• Moving a code from voluntary status into
law may be required (Privacy Act).
• Data access control must be stringent
(Privacy Act).
• A database should not be available for any
of the TCF members except to verify the
content of information that it provided
(Telecommunications Act).
• Clauses in the Telecommunications Industry
Codes provide for emergency conditions
but have been written in the context of call
information made available to emergency
services at the time of an emergency. This
wording could be modified to include the
CDEM sector’s requirements (TCF Codes).
• Any code for a public alerting system will
be subject to review and approval by the
Council of InternetNZ and the Board of the
Marketing Association, as mandated in the
SMS Anti-Spam Code.
• The Emergency Services Calling Code is
currently in development and may warrant
consideration for CDEM needs (ESC Code).
• Collection of personal information, compul-
sorily rather than voluntarily, necessitates
agreement that “the interests of the
individual resident or traveller are served
by the collection of information that is of a
personal nature to facilitate receipt of an
emergency warning” (Privacy Act).
• Extending a database to include informa-
tion that is not publicly available such as
unlisted numbers will require approval
(Telecommunications Privacy Code).
• Where information is collected directly, the
collecting agency must provide information
about content, purpose, recipients and
agency collecting (All existing opt-in
systems must be compliant) (TCF Codes).
• Access to personal information should only
be granted if necessary and under strict
control (Privacy Act).
• Information no longer current or required
must be deleted (Privacy Act).
• Show that information collected and used
is for purposes of public health and safety
(Privacy Act).
• Legislation may be required to prevent
subscribers from opting out (Unsolicited
Electronic Messages Act, Mobile Premium
Messaging Services Code).
• Spam filters may prevent receipt of warning
messages. This will require that the source
address(es) of emergency email and SMS
messages are white listed and not black-
listed (SMS Anti-Spam Code).
• Permission is required to override sub-
scriber blocking where caller line identifica-
tion is required to support emergency
actions (TCF Code).
• Seek a ruling that use of a search by
location / GPS is outside the meaning of
reverse search key based on the intended
use of the database (TCF Code, Privacy Act).
Expanded comments on the relevance and
possible actions that may be required are
located in Appendix 5 (Relevant Legislation).
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4  COMMUNICATIONS SYSTEM REVIEW
4.1 Fixed Line Technology
New Zealand is served primarily by the “Plain
Old Telephone System” (POTS) - a traditional
copper wire analogue network that reaches
most homes in New Zealand. There are also
other technologies connecting regional ex-
changes. Once an analogue only system, digital
telephone networks are an increasing compo-
nent, although most subscribers connect via
analogue circuits to the Public Switched
Telephone Network (PSTN). An expanded
description of fixed line technology is provided
in Appendix 6 (System Descriptions).
Normal circuit switched landline voice calling,
traditional fax, ADSL (broadband), and dialup
internet are each delivered over a combination
of the POTS copper analogue and digital
networks.
Types of alerting methods over fixed line
networks:
• Voice – including Interactive Voice Re-
sponse (IVR).
• Fax Broadcasting.
• Email.
All fixed line alert systems require knowledge
of the telephone numbers that are located in
the area of interest, that is address and
number are linked.
Constraints
As a result of current projects by both Telecom
and TelstraClear, for example the roll out of
next generation network (NGN)12,13 services,
future public alerting over fixed line technology
will become increasingly dependant on power
supply.
Local number portability and Voice over IP will
increase the complexity of any process that
seeks to identify numbers within a specified
area because the starting digits of any given
telephone number are no longer localised to a
particular street, suburb, town/city or region.
These issues are not necessarily a barrier to
use of fixed line options but do make it more
complex. Awareness of pending network
versatility has to be included in any solution
design and definition of industry codes.
Due to public concerns about privacy and
potential misuse of personal information,
legislation may be required to support the
development of a national database that links
telephone numbers, physical addresses, special
assistance requirements and other relevant
information (and perhaps also including GPS
references) to facilitate efficient delivery of a
public warning message to a targeted area. The
recent implementation of an Integrated Public
Number Database solution in Australia14 could
provide a suitable model for New Zealand to
follow and adapt.
Congestion Control and Next
Generation Networks (NGN)
The PSTN network is built to meet demand
that might occur at the busiest hour of the
busiest day for voice and data (dial-up). Load
factors vary by exchange. Telecom exchanges
have congestion control mechanisms predomi-
nantly based on call shedding. These are
internally controlled, and manually applied
where required by a 24 hour Network Opera-
tions Centre.
Only 111 and a handful of other emergency
service calls are able to connect when there is
network congestion. New Generation Network
will offer some improvement in congestion
control but the level of call prioritisation that is
available in these networks is still an open
question for Telecom NZ, TelstraClear can
currently prioritise numbers. For call
prioritisation to be effective it needs to occur
on the sending and receiving networks.
12 MED 2006. Summary of Telecom Broadband Services and
NGN Infrastructure Investment Issues[source: http://
www.med.govt.nz/upload/36549/summary-telecom-
broadband-services.pdf ]
Issues facing NGN and proposed standards for IP traffic
management are available from http://netlab.caltech.edu/
FAST/references/new-ecn-position.pdf
13 Telecom New Zealand 2005. “Telecom New Zealand and
Alcatel To Implement Next Generation Network”; from
http://www.geekzone.co.nz/content.asp?contentid=5116
(NGN Network Media Commentary media release).
14 http://www.acma.gov.au
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Similarly the threat of congestion to peak
capacity and any need for priority management
has not yet been made clear. The implication
for a public warning system is that actual
levels of performance for message delivery are
unknown and some post implementation
testing will be required.
Telecom NZ and Alcatel are currently building
the IP Voice platform for Telecom’s Next
Generation Network (NGN) proof of capability
to government is due mid 2009. A range of
new high value services will be possible as a
result15.
4.2 Mobile Network
Technology
Mobile market penetration is very high in New
Zealand. An overview of the New Zealand
mobile market is provided in Appendix 7
(Mobile Telecommunication Market).
Phone calls are made through a mobile
network by a mobile device communicating
with a cell site/base station controller (BSC),
which relays the communication over a radio
network to a carrier’s mobile switching centre
(MSC), which then routes it via the mobile
transmission network to the PSTN network if it
is a landline number; or through another
mobile carrier, or another internal MSC where it
terminates at the end user, if a mobile number.
Diagrammatic representations of how mobile
networks work may be found in Appendix 8
(Mobile Network Configuration Diagrams).
Types of alerting methods over mobile net-
works:
• Short Message Service (SMS).
• SMS with Geo-Location (location-aware).
• Cell Broadcasting (Type 1) (station identifi-
cation).
• Cell Broadcasting (Type 2) (broadcast
messaging).
• Email.
• Fax.
• Platform Specific Application.
Mobile networks are particularly sensitive to
power loss, as the infrastructure requires
power to operate. Telecommunication carriers
routinely employ a range of back-up power
capability to mitigate this; however, in a wide
spread prolonged power outage, i.e. over 24-
48 hours, mobile coverage could potentially be
severely degraded. This vulnerability to power
loss was illustrated in the February 2004 floods
when cell sites lost power in the Manawatu,
and in Northland in 2007.
Constraints
Mobile networks are largely designed for peak
periods with some additional capacity for
emergency situations.
Mobile voice networks do not cope well with
sudden extreme spikes in traffic volumes such
as those that might occur for rapid-onset wide-
scale civil defence events. However, slow-onset
events may allow carriers to implement
appropriate congestion control mechanisms
prior to the anticipated peak, such as:
• implementing “half rate” measures at
specific cell sites to double capacity;
• Adding hardware to cell sites  to increase
capacity;
• Deploying mobile “cell sites on wheels”
(COWS) to temporarily increase capacity in
areas with limited capacity or congested
cell sites (a regular occurrence at events
such as music festivals); and
• Implementing traffic prioritisation or load
restriction mechanisms to limit access to
radio access network in order to give
priority access to first responders. In
general, however, mobile telecommunica-
tion carriers have a very limited ability to
prioritise voice or SMS traffic, apart from
111 calls.
Cell Broadcast is an exception to the issue of
extreme spikes and is purported to work in a
fully-congested network.
Another general weakness for mobile phone
based alerting systems is that an alert would
not always be heard by the user. At night users
often either do not have their mobile phone
near them or they may switch them off. At
times during the day, users also turn them off
or onto “silent” mode; for example, while in
business meetings. Even when turned on, users
15 Telecom New Zealand 2005. “Telecom New Zealand and
Alcatel To Implement Next Generation Network”; from
http://www.geekzone.co.nz/content.asp?contentid=5116
(NGN Network Media Commentary media release)
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may not hear their phones for a variety of
reasons; for example, phones and users may
be in different rooms, background noise or
muffled by a hand bag.  Conversely, if someone
is at home they are more likely to hear a fixed
line ring given that households often have
more than one phone within their home.
4.3 Industry Feedback
Through a workshop and interviews, New
Zealand telecommunications carriers and
emergency services, such as the New Zealand
Police, have provided insights into the practi-
calities of applying various public alerting
systems in New Zealand.
Information was provided on the technical
constraints and opportunities associated with
currently available or near-term communica-
tions systems that are specific to consideration
of public alerting options in New Zealand.
The following summarises the feedback
received:
• A nation wide public alerting system will
need to be robust and resilient, which
could be achieved through the implementa-
tion of a range of complementary, multi-
layered alerting tools (for example, tel-
ecommunication based as well as broad-
cast media). It is also important to note
that No system is infallible and a telecom-
munications based public alerting applica-
tion will need to be one of a wider range of
alerting tools.
• The implementation of a nation wide public
alerting system will require strong govern-
ment leadership and coordination due to
the  complexity of the implementation
process and the coordination required of,
and between, the national telecommunica-
tion carriers.
• Existing government-industry reference
groups, such as the TCF, may preclude the
need to establish a new government-
telecommunication industry reference group
for the implementation of a public alerting
system.
• Setting and managing expectations will
also be crucial.
• Telecommunication networks are optimised
for “peak hour, peak period” load factors,
and not for public alerting traffic during
CDEM emergencies. Consequently, sufficient
capacity may need to be held in reserve or
be capable of being deployed rapidly
during an emergency event to ensure an
adequate performance level for alerting. An
alternative to in-place reserve capacity may
be traffic prioritisation mechanisms. These
performance measures, will however,
require significant investment.
• Type 2 cell broadcasting is preferable to
SMS as a mobile alerting tool due to its
ability to operate in a congested network.
• Public education is central to the success
of any alert system, to establish message
source credibility, facilitate increased public
uptake and population coverage, ensure
the correct responses from the public to
particular alerts, etc.
• Population density in Auckland is a major
issue for telecommunication based public
alerting tools, particularly mobile, because
of potential network congestion due to the
large number of messages required to be
sent over a small geographical area.
• Telecommunication carriers have existing
and planned future government obligations
that any alerting project implementation
must consider, such as Local and Mobile
Number Portability.
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5 INTERNET TECHNOLOGIES WITH ALERTING
APPLICATIONS
HTML Injection by Internet Service
Providers
It is possible for Internet Service Providers to
add/replace content in web site pages
downloaded by their users. This involves
modifying pages as they are downloaded by
subscribers to create a high visibility banner
across the top of the page notifying the
subscriber of a public alert. There is potential
for this technique to be used for ‘public good’
purposes - in this case public alerting.
To be effective, the content needs to be in a
highly prominent location on any downloaded
web page. In addition, as this technique needs
to be applied across diverse page designs, it
would probably be most appropriate to inject
the public alert as a full page width banner
that appears before the usual content of the
webpage. It is critical that any injected public
alert is displayed at the top of the page to
ensure that it is visible within the web browser
without scrolling.
Given the high rate of Internet usage during
waking hours this could be a particularly useful
tool. Local Internet service providers advise
that although possible in the New Zealand
context, this tool would require development.
This tool would be best suited for pre-prepared
messages rather than event specific alerts.
Web Browser Public Alerting Plug-ins
and Extensions
This solution offers similar functionality to
HTML injection but as an opt-in solution
achieved through browser plug-ins. Instead of
modifying the pages delivered through the ISP,
a public alerting browser plug-in would modify
the user interface of the browser to achieve the
same result – a high-visibility alert displayed
above the web page. In an event, a message
could be sent via an integrated alerting
system, which would then activate the plug-in
feature and display a message on those
computers that have downloaded the plug-in.
This solution would be suitable for event
specific alerts. A browser plug-in would source
the alerts from authoritative Common Alerting
Protocol (CAP) servers, and would not require
any involvement from the ISP, other than to
ensure that traffic is able to reach the CAP
servers.
This tool could be maintained through a global
consortium of interested parties as a global
solution allowing all countries to benefit from
the application and share costs. It would be
economically inefficient to redevelop the same
solution for each country. The plug-in would
automatically display messages relevant to the
country the computer is connected in.
SP Uploaded Banners
An alternative to HTML injection and Plug-in
solutions could be to develop a memorandum
of understanding with the top ten frequented
New Zealand websites, whereby they upload a
banner onto their site in an emergency.
According to Hitwise New Zealand’s July 2008
“Top 20 Websites” report, the top ten fre-
quented websites encompassed 20% of the
total traffic in New Zealand. This is a reason-
able coverage of the population given the
number of overall websites; for example,
Trademe has on average 50,000 people online
at any one time.
This would be a relatively low-cost and quick
solution to implement and is arguably a more
effective broadcast medium during business
hours than either television or radio.
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6  DISCUSSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS
The Study has found that the supporting
telecommunication infrastructure to create
and implement a national public alerting
system is largely in place for most of the
options that were investigated, apart from cell
broadcasting.
The following recommendations broadly fall
into two categories:
• Development of a Public Alerting Frame-
work, which refers to the environment
required to support the development of a
nationally consistent approach to public
alerting.
• Selection of Public Alerting System(s),
which refers to specific communication
products or suites of products used for
public alerting.
6.1 Public Alerting System
Framework
The variety of commercially available public
alerting systems both here and overseas, and
the rapid changes occurring in the use of
communications technology suggests that
Government (at least in the short term), in
conjunction with stakeholders such as the TCF
and the TEPF, should focus on developing a
public alerting framework (i.e. a system
concept that is built on standards and
interoperability) which sets a minimum func-
tional requirement for entry and participation
in the system.  Strong central government
support may be necessary to advance the
development of this framework, due to the
national coverage required, potential costs
involved and the role of public alerting
systems as a key piece of critical infrastructure.
The failure to develop a robust Public Alerting
Framework may result in ad-hoc deployments
of alerting systems that are not interoperable,
and cannot be easily integrated. Such a
situation may, for example, require a responsi-
ble agency to generate separate and multiple
alerts for each alerting technology in use (e.g.
landline, SMS) and across different CDEM
regions. Conversely, a multi-mode alerting
system which utilises a single proprietary
interface to send alerts may not allow the
integration of other systems into the manage-
ment interface.
Without a framework in place for public
alerting, New Zealand runs the real risk of
silos of public alerting systems being imple-
mented that cannot be integrated together in
times of need to provide timely and effective
public alerts, particularly when trying to send
alerts to multiple regions, or nationally.
The objective of a Public Alerting System
Framework therefore is to provide a stand-
ards-based approach that will lead to the
implementation of a platform independent
interoperable public alerting system. This is
essential to enable national agencies,
regional, and local authorities to adopt the
public alerting communication methods that
are best suited for use in their region without
compromising their ability to be integrated
into a national public alerting network.
As with other elements of Whole-of-Govern-
ment information technology, this will require
the involvement of key agencies with respon-
sibilities around information architecture.
Specifically, the Information Communication
Technologies Branch of the State Services
Commission, the Department of Internal
Affairs Government Technology Office, the
New Zealand Geospatial Office, the Ministry
of Civil Defence and Emergency Manage-
ment, LINZ and Local Government New
Zealand would have significant roles in
creating a Whole-of-Government framework
for public alerting.
Fundamental Data
An integrated public alerting system will
require a significant amount of fundamental
information to support its operation. A base
component of this will be the establishment of
a public number database; either a central-
ised database such as the National Address
register (NAR), or distributed databases
within an integrated framework to allow alert
messages to be sent to fixed line phones.
Page 28 NZ Telecommunications Based Public Alerting Systems Technology Study
Currently, there are a number of different
overlapping datasets of fixed line subscriber
information in use, and often these are
commercial and have pricing and licensing
restrictions in place that may prevent indi-
vidual emergency management organisations
from fully utilising the same dataset.
For example, there are a number of commer-
cial vendors, respectively, of road, phone
number and addressing data such as
Terralink, who currently provide the road and
addressing dataset used by the 111 Commu-
nication Centres. However, sharing of this
data with other emergency management
agencies is restricted due to privacy legisla-
tion; while in other cases, particular agencies
may choose not to license the data set due to
the costs involved.
This road and addressing information is
required to help take textual address informa-
tion such as a landline customer’s address
for service – e.g. street number, road name
and suburb – to enable the address to be
mapped and allow spatial queries to be
performed on a customer database.
111 Services
All landline providers provide limited cus-
tomer information to the 111 centres. Use of
this information is very restricted due to
privacy concerns. Currently, the information
passed to the emergency services can only
be used for 111 services and cannot be used
for emergency management purposes. This
means that subscriber information provided
to the 111 Communication Centres by the
landline providers may not be applicable or
utilisable for public alerting purposes. In
some cases, information may even be
withheld by the telecommunications compa-
nies from the 111 Communication Centres –
particularly information related to confidential
and withheld numbers.
Even for the 111 Communication Centres, the
mapping of Caller Identification details to a
location is not 100% accurate. In personal
communication, New Zealand Police have
advised that whilst the Caller ID mapping
capability has improved from 60% to 80% of
presented numbers over the past 3-4 years, the
111 Services system is still not capable of
addressing all numbers presented.
For this reason, 111 Services may not be the
most optimal environment to support public
alerting. However, the 111 Services are
currently the best source of a location specific
phone number database. The policy and
legislative changes outlined previously may
provide mechanisms for access to, and use
of, the database by MCDEM.
National Address Register (NAR)
The failure of key Government agencies to
construct a National Address Register (NAR)
mid-way through 2008 suggests that an
approach to construct a single national
database for public alerting will be prohibi-
tively expensive, difficult to maintain, vulner-
able to privacy issues and completion risks.
The NAR was intended to provide a nationally
authoritative dataset that provided road
centrelines, street addressing and place
name information – fundamental geo-spatial
data that would form the foundation of any
public alerting dataset produced. It would
have been consistently used across many
government agencies and local government.
The NAR tendering process resulted in three
tenders that meet the tender requirements
and the price range fell between $9 million
and $48 million for conforming tender
responses.
Any effort to construct a public alerting
database would require either a NAR to be in
place to provide an authoritative location
database, or would need to build one from
scratch. It could be assumed that the cost of
constructing a database for public alerting
purposes could cost more than $9 million if
an authoritative location database is to be
constructed as part of the project. This
excludes ongoing maintenance costs that
would be in addition to those figures men-
tioned above.
There still exists a need for a comprehensive
and authoritative dataset that covers roads,
addressing and place names – however it is
unlikely to be achieved in a manner outlined
in the NAR tender.
Fundamental datasets such as the NAR
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concept are still required for public alerting
and these needs should be communicated to
groups responsible – such as the Geospatial
Executive Group, the New Zealand
Geospatial Office and Land Information New
Zealand (LINZ).
An Alternative Distributed Approach
An alternative to creating a large single
comprehensive dataset for public alerting
purposes would be the US approach, where
agencies responsible for public alerting
produce a geographical definition of an area
(or areas) that an alert is applicable to. This
geographical definition would then be pack-
aged into the Common Alerting Protocol (CAP)
format and provided to all telecommunication
carriers that are part of the public alerting
system. It would then be the responsibility of
each telecommunication carrier to use the
information contained in the CAP message to
identify, using their own systems and
databases, all of their own customers within
the defined geographical area.
This approach would allow individual telecom-
munication carriers to maintain and control their
own customer database, without requiring them
to share this customer information with any
other agency or competitor. This would avoid
the requirement and significant costs associated
with the construction and maintenance of a
large national dataset, and minimise related
issues such as commercial sensitivity.
Public Alerting Information Database
A two tier approach to the development of a
national Public Alerting Information Database
may provide an optimal strategy to manage
the conflicting demands of information
collection and verification against privacy
concerns and demands. Under such an
approach, general records may only require a
minimum amount of personal information,
while an ‘opt-in’ oriented process may also be
available or could be directed to identify
people with vulnerabilities or special needs,
such as the aged or people in care, in order
to match public alerting efforts with their
particular requirements for assistance.
A suggested schema for the New Zealand
public number database would include:
• public number;
• name of the customer (optional;)
• address at which the number terminates;
• service location (optional);
• name of the carriage service provider;
• whether the person(s) at the address
require special assistance in an emer-
gency (optional);
• nature of assistance (mandatory if
assistance is required); and
• GPS reference.
Standards and the Role of the
Common Alerting Protocol
Public alerting is a problem that will involve a
wide range of technologies to address
specific requirements, and possibly an even
wider variety of stakeholder organisations.
Consequently, the most optimal way to
ensure that these diverse systems can be
integrated to provide a best-of-breed and fit-
for-purpose public alerting system will be by
mandating a standards-based approach to
ensure interoperability.
The US National Science and Technology
Council (2000)16 recommended that:
A standard method should be devel-
oped to collect and relay instantane-
ously and automatically all types of
hazard warnings and reports locally,
regionally, and nationally for input into
a wide variety of dissemination
systems.
Between 2001 and 2004, the Common
Alerting Protocol (CAP) was developed, and
in April 2004 CAP v1.0 was approved by the
OASIS Emergency Management Technical
Committee17. This was updated to v1.1 within
18 months, and in September 2007 was
accepted by the International Telecommuni-
cations Union (ITU) as Recommendation
X.130318.
16 US National Science and Technology Council, 2000.
Effective Disaster Warnings, Report by the Working Group
on Natural Disaster Information Systems Subcommittee on
Natural Disaster Reduction.
17 http://xml.coverpages.org/
emergencyManagement.html#cap
18 http://www.itu.int/ITU-T/newslog/Common+Alerting+
Protocol+Becomes+iTUT+Recommendation.aspx
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CAP plays a pivotal role in any public alerting
framework, as it is a standard that defines
how alerting information is represented for
communication between a wide variety of
disparate information systems. CAP is, in
effect, the glue that ties together a comprehen-
sive public alerting system.
CAP has the ability to greatly simplify the
management of multiple alerting systems.
Generally, each alerting system vendor has a
proprietary interface that is used to generate
and send an alert. If multiple vendors and
systems are utilised for alerting, this can
make it difficult to send out alerts to multiple
systems in a timely manner as the alert has
to be created and sent using each alerting
system interface.
Systems are now being deployed that provide
a single master interface to generate a CAP
message and communicates this to each
alerting system that has been deployed. CAP
messages can be fed into all public alerting
systems, not just telecommunications based
systems.
Regulatory Changes
The study has identified a wide rangle of
policies, codes of practice and legislation that
will need to be reviewed in more depth to
more fully understand their implications for,
and impact on, the development of a national
public alerting system framework. In some
cases, the modification of existing prescrip-
tive documents (for example, the Telecommu-
nication Codes) will be required to facilitate
the drafting of new legislation and codes.
While the identification of specific modifica-
tions to individual policies, Codes or pieces of
legislation that might lead to the achievement
of optimal public alerting outcomes was
outside the scope of this investigation, such a
process will need to include the following
elements:
• Determination by the Privacy Commis-
sioner on key points of the Privacy Act,
such as whether the association of a
telephone number with an address is
regarded as personal information when the
identity of an individual, family or organisa-
tion that uses the telephone number is not
part of the information record.
or
• If personal information is included, it is
because the subscriber has opted to
provide the information19.
• Defining the governance framework for
the proposed public warning system and
engagement with the TCF to establish
enabling codes regarding the rules for
collection, maintenance and use of
information collected for the purposes of
emergency management. Specifically:
a. Supply of customer connection
information to database code;
b. Designate the database administering
authority; and
c. Management and operation of public
warning system database code;
including storage, disposal and
security;
• Consideration of the cost implications of
operating codes and who pays for the
service(s);
• Securing signoff from TCF members;
• Determination and ratification by the
Commissioners for Privacy and Telecom-
munications.
Recommendations: National Public
Alerting System Framework
1 A cost-benefit analysis will need to be
undertaken to determine the cost and
technical effectivness of a telecommuni-
cation based national public alerting
system as a core component of New
Zealand’s public alerting suite of tools for
civil defence emergencies. The GNS
Science Report (SR2008-34) provides a
useful tool for making such comparisons.
2 An appropriate governance structure to
provide oversight over the specification of
the Public Alerting framework the imple-
mentation and maintenance of the alerting
system will need to be determined. Strong
leadership and coordination structures will
need to be developed, and driven by
central government, due to the importance
of a national public alerting system as a
core component of New Zealand’s critical
infrastructure.
3 Decisions will need to be made around the
supporting legislation that might be required1 9 Privacy Act 1993 No 28: Privacy Principle Clause 2 (g) (i)
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to progress the development and implemen-
tation of the national Public Alerting
framework; and the obligations they might
impose on the telecommunications carriers.
We note that internationally, telecommunica-
tion carrier participation in the implementa-
tion of public alerting systems has been on
a vountary basis rather than being man-
dated through legislation.
4 Potentially impeding legislation around
privacy and the transmission of ‘Spam’ or
unsolicited communications will need to be
altered in order to facilitate the collection
and management of information critical to
meeting public alerting objectives, as well
as the utilisation of that information by
government agencies outside the 111
Services to contact many people at the
same time.
5 The State Services Commission and Local
Government New Zealand will need to be
embedded in the development of the
framework to ensure that an open and
standards-based whole-of-government
public alerting system architecture is both
developed for, and adopted as, a govern-
ment standard.
6 We suggest that a suitable partnership be
explored between government and the
telecommunications carriers to advance the
development of the national public alerting
system framework. One analogue for such a
partnership is the REANNZ (Research and
Education Advanced Network New Zealand
Ltd) vehicle that was established to imple-
ment the high speed nationwide Kiwi
Advanced Research and Education Network
(KAREN) Network amongst New Zealand’s
academic, education and research commu-
nity. REANNZ is the Crown-owned company
set up to establish, own and operate a
high-speed telecommunications network for
the research and education sectors. One of
its key objectives is to “facilitate participa-
tion by multiple telecommunications sector
partners so as to ensure the greatest
possible flexibility for ongoing evolution”
(http://www.karen.net.nz/about-reannz/).
Such a partnership may provide a useful
commercial platform to advance essentially
a ‘public good’ project, should Government
decide to secure voluntary participation by
the carriers for the implementation of a
national public alerting system, rather than
legislating their participation. While a
national public alerting system should be
considered as core critical infrastructure,
significant goodwill will be required from the
telecommunications carriers in a voluntary
setting, as the implementation of the
national public alerting system, even if
funded predominantly by government,
would require significant technical integra-
tion by the carriers into the existing
telecommunications networks, as well as
ongoing maintenance, in a resource and
capacity constrained sector.
        We suggest that in the initial stages, this
discussion is advanced through the
Telecommunication’s Emergency Planning
Forum (TEPF), in conjunction with the
Telecommunications Carriers Forum (TCF).
7 Fundamental public datasets for public
alerting should be identified and communi-
cated to the New Zealand Geospatial
Office (NZGO) so that it can be brought to
the attention of the Geospatial Executive
Group (GEG) and LINZ.
8 It is important to ascertain the range of
other government and emergency manage-
ment agencies would require access to any
database created for the purpose of the
alerting system, the specific data require-
ments of each specific agency, and in
particular, the political, legislative and
policy implications that would result from
such access; for example, while access to
special needs information will enable
emergency services better to focus their
efforts and resources to where they might
be needed most in an emergency event,
access to such information outside an
emergency event, even if done
inadvertantly, may trigger unexpected
consequences from a legal perspective.
9 Ownership and appropriate allocation of
costs towards ongoing operation and
maintenance programmes for any sup-
porting database to a public alerting
system will need to be determined. This
information was outside the scope of this
study.
1 0 A suitable protocol for retrieving public
numbers for fixed line phone services that
have been ‘geo-coded’ or pre-defined to a
location will need to be investigated.
While retrival of the information can be
undertaken in a number of ways (i.e. via an
integrated geo-coded public number
database or broker systems between the
alert system and the carriers that tell the
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carriers system the location the alert is to
be sent to and allows the carriers system
to choose the appropriate numbers within
that area), the retrival protocol must take
into account the various Telecommunica-
tions Codes, relevant legislation and
potentially conflicting policies that might
apply. There are also existing databases
managed by the carriers, such as that
used for number portability, that could be
extended and accessed via this or
another protocol.  Additionally, the scope
of a number of initiatives currently being
undertaken on the national location
database (and managed by the New
Zealand Police) could potentially be
extended to provide content and types of
access that support a public warning
system.
1 1 Appropriate contractual arrangements will
need to be entered into with the Telecom-
munication Carriers that ensure expecta-
tions around delivery of alert messages
and liability are clear.
1 2 Further detailed investigation should be
made into the adoption of the Common
Alerting Protocol (CAP) as the
interoperability and e-Government
standard for alerting systems. This should
include detailed research into
deployments overseas that have utilised
CAP to integrate a variety of vendors
alerting systems.
1 3 The infrastructure for a Public Alerting
Framework could also support and
complement the National Warning
System, GeoNet and other alerting
systems currently in place. An investiga-
tion should be undertaken to identify, and
where feasible and cost effective, align
the scope of the national public alerting
system with the needs of hazard monitor-
ing agencies such as GNS, NIWA and
MetService.
1 4 The national public alerting framework will
need to mandate that new entrants to the
national public alerting system (i.e.
telecommunications carriers, public
alerting application vendors, etc) meet a
minimum set of standards and provide a
core set of functionality. This will be
necessary to minimise erosion or skewing
of capabilities as new and diverse public
alerting technology offerings enter the
market place. At present, the Civil De-
fence Act in of itself is not sufficiently
compelling to enforce such a requirement.
6.2 Public Alerting System
Selection and Evaluation
Following the development of the national
Public Alerting System framework, including
the identification of key performance criteria,
the next step will be the development of a
process to identify and evaluate potential
public alerting systems options against the
performance criteria. A range of pathways are
available; including choosing an existing
product, a vendor (telecommunications
network, carrier or other) to develop and
implement, a consortium of vendors or an
independent developer or team of to build.
Once the required regulatory changes are
sufficiently underway, this process may be
undertaken in parallel and could potentially
reduce time to implementation.
A variety of integrated alerting systems have
been identified that are currently available
and could be implemented to allow a range of
alerts to be distributed over the New Zealand
telecommunications network infrastructure.
Given that integrated systems are available, it
would be illogical to have different systems
for different communication methods unless
there are specific alerting requirements that
could not be met by the integrated systems.
The minimum functional requirement for the
integrated systems should be their ability to
provide for a number of users at local,
regional and national level to be able to
access information and send alerts as
required.
Sourcing Mobile Location Information
One of the more difficult components is a
method to source the mobile device numbers
within a defined alert area. Given that cell
broadcasting is currently not a feasible
solution over both the major carriers, SMS
with geo-location would appear to be the
most suitable mobile option for getting
messages to mobile devices within a defined
alert area at present. SMS is less desirable
than cell broadcasting due to its reduced
effectiveness as a result of congestion during
events. However, the level of investment to
enable cell broadcasting on the Telecom
Page 33Discussion and Recommendations
network warrants further investigation before
finalising a decision mobile device geo-location
methods.
There are a number of other methods for
identifying the location of mobile devices,
which place differing loads on networks. Some
are available now but the specific public alert
applications examined in this study appear to
be reasonably cost intensive. Significant work
is also being performed by other vendors
around this service who were not contacted by
the study team. More detailed costings and
information on integration capabilities should
be sought from the vendors who could provide
this technology.
A further alternative is to link a mobile number
to a person’s home address. This is not an
optimal solution as it does not cater for times
when users are not in their home area, e.g.
when working or travelling.  However, it is
likely to reduce the cost and implementation
timeframes for the alerting system.
The project has identified that the traditional
alerting method of sending a text message to a
mobile device might not necessarily be the
only or best choice for the system.  Other
options such as “Cell ID” and ringing and
hanging up may be desirable also. Any alerting
system will need to be capable of sending
alternative types of messages to cater for
special needs parts of the community (e.g. a
voice message to a mobile for the blind). This
is really only feasible through an “opt-in”
programme.
Fixed Line Phone Considerations
Fixed line phone systems are not designed for
multi-point use and can quickly become
congested at both the origination and termi-
nation areas. There are options to mitigate
this congestion through spreading dial-out
lines over a number of exchanges. A fixed
line alert system would appear to be most
viable for geographically small urban areas
where the risk of large volumes of calls into a
single exchange and consequent overloading
is minimised.
User Requirement Definition
It is recommended that MCDEM undertake a
project to define data and user requirements
as the next step towards defining a functional
specification for a public alerting system. This
project would include consultation with CDEM
Groups and other agencies that could meet
Privacy Act Principle 10 (d) relating to
emergencies as well as the Telecommunica-
tion Emergency Planning Forum and the
GAC .
The outcome of this consultation would be:
• An understanding of which agencies would
want access to the system and be willing
to contribute financially to its development
and maintenance.
• Clear identification and agreement on what
the public alerting system is trying to
achieve and basic system requirements
documented, e.g.
– What volumes of people will the
alerting system have to cater for e.g. is
Auckland the worst case scenario, or is
there a situation where a greater than
regionally sized alert would have to be
sent?
– What are the acceptable population and
geographic coverage levels? From a
telecommunications perspective 100% is
not attainable.
– Is opt-in acceptable or part of the
solution?
– Is nationwide required or are high risk
area’s sufficient?
– What functionality is mission critical
and not able to be sacrificed and what
is desirable?
– What type of message needs to be sent
i.e. just a tone, direction to secondary
information sources or a full message?
• An appreciation of the specific data fields
that would be required for any supporting
database.
• Identification of specific prescriptive
document requirements to enable access to
the system and data for by the agencies
concerned.
Selection of Public Alerting Tools
Once system functionality requirements have
been established, selection of specific public
alerting tools will be required. In determining
the tools to be used, clear expectations of
telecommunication carriers will need to be
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established.
Overseas experience has demonstrated that
when public alerting systems have been
implemented, unanticipated complexities
have frequently arisen. In seeking proposals
for public alerting solutions, the prior experi-
ence of the potential providers in public
alerting system implementations should be
taken into consideration. Providers with
previous experience may be better able to
anticipate issues and more accurately
forecast costs and implementation
timeframes than those that have not had
such experience.
The resilience of public alerting tools and
their underlying infrastructure is critical. In
selecting public alerting tools, careful consid-
eration should be made that the tools se-
lected have different risk profiles. For exam-
ple, sole reliance on mobile telecommunica-
tions infrastructure would possibly present
high vulnerabilities in an Auckland volcanic
emergency.
Careful consideration should be given to
choice of vendor and how resilient the
supporting alert tool infrastructure is and any
risk this may introduce. For example, if one
New Zealand Telecommunications Carrier was
chosen to support the tool and they were
seriously impacted as part of the event, not
only is the telecommunications capability for
that carrier lost but the alerting tool for the
other carriers also.
The following components have been identi-
fied as key elements of a robust telecommu-
nication based public alerting system:
• Channels of delivery that enable contact
with all persons in the area of concern at
first alert phase and during the event.
• Integrated Public Number Database (IPND)
integrated with GIS data.
• Ability to send voice and text messages.
• Ability to send cell broadcast messages (if
this option is chosen).
• Ability to send voice messages through a
text to voice converter.
• Ability to send emails.
• Contact database and group management
with automated update.
• System for locating mobile devices in area.
• User interface that incorporates reporting
functionality including call reporting.
• Throttle management (ability to deliver
messages at a rate the network(s) can
manage without overload).
• Bi-directional communication as required
(may be use of * and # keys).
• Message validation (component that gives
the message credibility).
• Integration with other processes and
agreements that support response
management e.g. there may not be a
need to provide evacuation assistance for
an area where all residents had confirmed
they did not need assistance.
Public Alerting Systems
Recommendations
1 User requirements to be defined and a
request for proposal submitted to both
domestic and international alerting system
providers.
2 A location based “non-opt-in” solution
should be chosen if constraints allow, as
population coverage is significantly
decreased with “opt-in” solutions. How-
ever, there are opt-in solutions currently in
use in some regions which have had
limited success and therefore, opt-in
solutions should not be discounted
immediately.  Should the opt-in method be
preferred, the supporting infrastructure for
the vendors and carriers will need to be
made more resilient.
3 Systems should:
– support load management;
– operate on resilient infrastructure
principles;
– support interactive response; and
– support multi-mode delivery for
increased reach and verification.
6.3 Overcoming Operational
Limitations
Domestically (June 2006 Auckland Power Issue)
and internationally (July 2005 London Bomb-
ings), it has become apparent that mobile
networks are prone to congestion in wide scale
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events. Fixed line networks are also vulnerable
to congestion. An alerting system is likely to
either place or prompt the public to place
significant additional load on the telecommuni-
cations networks. However, there is facility to
optimise networks, prioritise calls (i.e.
TelstraClear can presently and Vodafone NZ is
investigating) and raise capacity. Government
should consider working with the TEPF to
develop improved congestion control and/or
optimisation mechanisms to support an
alerting system and to protect communication
channels in wide-scale events.
Telecom NZ is implementing new mobile and
fixed line networks. Engagement with
Telecom NZ now offers an opportunity to
establish expectations about public alerting
and congestion control capability and have
facilities for these included.
Regardless of the public alerting solutions
that are selected, a strong public education
programme, with both local/regional and
national components, will need to be imple-
mented. Components of public alerting will
likely generate curiosity and raise privacy
related questions from the public. Anticipation
of this interest presents an opportunity to both
address public concerns and to promote public
alerting education messages without having to
actively solicit widespread public attention.
6.4 Immediately Available
Alerting Solutions
A number of short-term solutions that would
assist in public alerting were identified during
this project. Many of these could be imple-
mented relatively easily while a more robust
integrated public alerting tool is being
developed. Consideration should be given to
implementing facility for:
• Sending localised public alerts via text
message on the Vodafone NZ network.
• Sending alerts to foreign citizens within
New Zealand on both Telecom NZ and the
Vodafone NZ network;
• Uploading banners with public alerts onto
the top ten frequented websites;
• Developing a protocol to upload alert
banners on web-pages in an emergency
event;
• Using Type 1 cell broadcasting to replace
Vodafone NZ cell site names displaying
on mobile devices to emergency mes-
sages.
6.5 Final Comments
In conclusion, the New Zealand telecommuni-
cations infrastructure is capable of, if not
currently enabled, to support an advanced
mass public alerting tool, and a range of
products and development options are
available.
Several decisions need to be made by central
government prior to the selection of alerting
applications, development of an alerting
framework and implementation of an alerting
system. Among the decisions are how such
an initiative should be funded, allocation of
costs and responsibilities, what enabling
policies and legislation may be required.
Although establishing a nation-wide alerting
project is complex, it presents significant
local, regional and national benefit. Without
it, the likelihood of individual regions being
able to implement an effective multifaceted
local public warning tool is low.
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APPENDIX 1: Opt-In System Supporting Calculations 
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92,050 4.35 56,376 74.8 42,169 4000 9.49 
Rodney 70,304 56,243 5.33 33,444 78.2 26,153 3000 11.47 
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APPENDIX 2: Emerging Technologies 
 
An Advanced 'In Case of Emergency' (ICE) Application 
The combination of the capabilities discussed present some exciting opportunities in public 
alerting and indeed emergency management in general. One example will be outlined 
below. The Apple iPhone will be used as an example device due to its recent release and 
appeal to consumers. This should apply to any recent device that contains the capabilities 
similar to those highlighted above. 
In recent years, the concept of having an 'In Case of Emergency' (ICE) contact stored in 
mobile phones has gained some official support. However, this is usually limited to just 
recording contact details in an address book entry and doesn't utilise the full potential of the 
newer mobile devices. 
The release of the Application Store (App Store) for the iPhone on July 11, 2008 saw the 
first ICE applications provided for the iPhone. Examples include 'ICE' and 'My Emergency 
Info'. In addition to providing emergency contact information, these are now allowing 
individuals to record medical notes such as allergies, medications and conditions. 
It is conceivable to take these applications a great step further and bring public alerting 
directly to these applications - in part creating an application that is the go-to program for an 
emergency for the user. 
For example, an emergency application could be made Common Alerting Protocol (CAP – 
an xml based data format for alerting technologies) - aware, so that the device can receive 
CAP alerts over the Internet. An individual could subscribe to a New Zealand Alerts service 
run by the New Zealand Government that provides secure push distribution of New Zealand 
alerts in a CAP format from any central or local government agency. Upon receipt of a push 
alert in CAP format, the application on the device could enable the device's A-GPS function, 
calculate the current location of the user, and determine whether the device is within the 
geographical bounds of the alert as defined in the CAP message. Then, if the device is near 
or within the area of the CAP alert, it would alert the user.  
An application should go even further though as it would be possible to embed 
recommended emergency actions into the application, that can then be displayed following 
receipt of an alert. For example, recommended general actions for particular emergency 
types (earthquake, flood, volcano, pandemic etc) could be included with the application. 
Additional specific actions for the event could be embedded in the CAP alert. 
The application could be further extended to allow individuals, families and businesses to 
include brief plans such as family emergency plans and/or checklists to guide initial 
response actions. It could maintain a regularly updated database of Civil Defence centres, 
which would allow the application to provide guidance to the nearest centre. Ideally the New 
Zealand Government network service suggested above would also be able to record the 
status of Civil Defence welfare centres so that it could advise which facilities are open and 
receiving those impacted by the event. 
Over time it could also support the communication of event information to authorities. For 
example, with appropriate standards for emergency information interchange in place, the 
application could allow a user to take a geo-tagged photo of a downed power pole, add a 
textual note, and communicate this directly to the relevant local authority (as determined by 
the embedded latitude and longitude within the image) so that they can review, verify, and 
take action as appropriate. As the image is geo-tagged, it would be able to be easily 
imported into a geospatially-capable Emergency Management Information System and 
displayed on a map. 
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There is significant potential for a conceptual mobile application that provides not only 
alerting capabilities, but also interactive and reference functions. Even if communications are 
not available during some events, reference information contained within the device may be 
useful to the affected individual in, say, providing event-specific guidance around response 
actions. 
Client applications would need to be constructed for each major mobile device platform 
(Windows, Blackberry, Apple, Symbian and Palm), and standards for emergency information 
interchange would be utilised to transfer information over the network. There is also nothing 
stopping similar applications being developed for desktop operating systems so that similar 
alerting capabilities can be deployed in homes, corporates and government agencies in 
parallel using the same infrastructure and architecture. 
Whilst these mobile devices are currently in the higher end of the market, it is expected that 
over time devices with these extensive capabilities will become more and more accessible to 
the general population. 
Any significant alerting investments in existing network infrastructure will need to be carefully 
considered against investment in more advanced, intelligent, and distributed systems that 
fully utilise the capabilities of current and future technology. 
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APPENDIX 3: Non Opt-In Integrated Public Alerting Systems 
 
Appendix 3a: UMS Population Alert System 
 
Description UMS PAS is a multi-communication channel system including fixed 
line, location based mobile, fax, email with radio, TV and web 
publishing being integrated via CAP (Common Alert Protocol).  It 
allows geo-targeting of people (fixed and mobile) both adhoc and pre-
defined via an area manager and possesses two way communication 
capabilities.  
The system is mainly used in Scandinavia. Their related group alert 
system is used by the national emergency authorities in all the 
Scandinavian countries (Norway, Sweden and Denmark).  
PAS uses intelligent distribution techniques to assist the sending of 
alert messages and protecting both the fixed and mobile network from 
congestion and overload. PAS can be used as a collaborative system 
shared among the different contributors involved in emergency 
situation. The profile system allows different users with different roles 
to have differing access to functionality.  
A range of alert messages can be pre-programmed and a selection of 
add-on packages can be provided: 
TAS: Traveller Alert System for identification and alert of New Zealand 
travellers abroad 
UAS: Underground Alert Services for identification and alert of people 
underground (within tunnels and subways with cell coverage) 
GAS: CDEM personnel alert system 
GIS: PAS has an integrated GIS interface. Other GIS interfaces may 
be integrated. 
PAS was found to be unique in that for the mobile network they install 
a probe within the mobile network infrastructure that retains 
information real time on where devices are. Therefore when an alert is 
required to be sent, the PAS system queries the probe for the location 
information of devices in the selected area. This allows quick localised 
sending of SMS messages.  This capability was not seen in any other 
provider the project team reviewed.  
UMS PAS services/applications/solutions are multi-patented – 
including their products around the handling of congestion, localisation 
procedures and optimised message distribution.  
Infrastructure 
considerations 
The PAS system is a set of hardware, location selection is critical for 
its resilience. The PAS system itself has extended fail over features 
and load balancing mechanisms. 
UMS states that  two major types of congestion can occur;: 
-Overload of the core network (HLR, VLR etc). 
-Overload of the air interface 
Core network congestion is the more harmful one which may cause 
severe failure. They state that by optimisation of the SMS sending 
process the core network and message distribution will both be faster 
and far less vulnerable than ordinary SMS, allowing larger volumes 
and throughput.  
Speed This is primarily constrained by carrier infrastructure within the area, 
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but the UMS system can provide the following:  
Voice calls: 
Approximately 900 voice messages pr. Minute 
Text messages: 
The limitation is within the air interface which has previously been 
discussed. 
Reach PAS has a high level of population coverage. For special needs areas 
of the public specific user groups can be created. For example hearing 
impaired may receive a text alert, aged a phone call, same for blind 
people etc. 
Tourists and visitors do not require opting in.  
Costs Refer Appendix 5. 
Strengths Key strengths are:  
PAS is scalable and may be used both for smaller incidents in rural 
areas as well as for larger incidents in urban areas/cities.  
It has a high degree of functionality and sophistication in its security 
and user interface including reporting on network congestion levels.  
Integrated congestion protection features and optimized technology 
for alert message distribution. 
PAS’s key differentiator for New Zealand’s alerting requirements is 
that their mobile network probe technology allows text messages to be 
sent to a defined area easily and quickly.  
Weaknesses  Key weaknesses are: 
UMS believes all public initiated SMS traffic can be halted at the 
network layer to allow PAS messages to be sent through. However it 
is still subject to congestion issues at the cell site level.  Therefore if 
the cell site layer is already congested messages may not get through. 
In a non-congested network it is a viable initial warning tool.  A 
combination of this priority scheme and a radio network congestion 
control system may make SMS into a viable solution for public alerts 
throughout an event.   
The fact that this particular vendor is overseas would need to be 
considered for ongoing maintenance requirements.  
 
Implementation 
considerations 
UMS believe implementation timeframes once carrier acceptance has 
been gained and the supporting environment e.g. legislation is in 
place could be as little as a month.  
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Appendix 3b: CIWS  
 
Description An Australian integrated fixed-line and mobile solution that is in 
development through the collaborative efforts of the Victoria State 
government, Telstra, and Ericsson. A full report on the system and its 
trial accompany this report. Excerpts are included here. 
Infrastructure 
considerations 
 
In an operational system the participants’ database would be replaced 
by a New Zealand equivalent of the Australian government’s 
Integrated Public Number Database.  The issue of a NZ IPND is 
addressed elsewhere in this report. 
 
A number of lines commensurate with the number of subscribers to be 
reached within a given time-frame are needed to deliver messages to 
fixed line subscribers. 
Speed  On one occasion during the CIWS Trial when a limited number of call 
out lines (20) were available, it took 60 seconds for delivery of the first 
message.  When the number of call-out lines was increased to 61 the 
message delivery time was cut to 40 seconds. 
Reach National  
Costs Not available 
Strengths Key strengths are: 
Integrates fixed and mobile with GIS data  
Provides visual reporting on locations and numbers reached 
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Within reach for implementation and support 
Reaches all subscribers within a designated area 
Uses voice calling to reach target subscribers 
Weaknesses  Key weaknesses are: 
The number of fixed line subscribers reached within a specified time is 
proportional to the number of call-out lines available and any 
congestion that occurs at the target exchange(s) 
Implementation 
considerations 
Access to an integrated public number database and the detail of 
information in that database 
Facilities and  other infrastructure established in New Zealand 
Delivery of technology to provide geospatial data for mobile phones 
Privacy issues regarding geospatial mobile data 
Independence of system management from any single carrier 
Socio-psychological considerations regarding receipt and response to 
emergency messages  
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Appendix 3c: Alerts Message Broker (CellCast Technologies) 
 
Description The CellCast Alerts Message Broker System is a multi-communication 
channel system. It has an integrated web interface that allows multiple 
messages to be sent via a range of channels including voice, email, 
SMS, IM and web as well as mass scale alerting over public mobile 
communications systems using cell broadcast. 
The system contains an area manager function where a user can 
draw a polygon provided around the area they wish to target. 
For mass alerting by cell broadcast the recipient receives an SMS like 
text message 
on the screen of their phone. The phone also rings and vibrates. On 
board devices on the mobile could also perform text to speech 
translation for the blind. 
Infrastructure 
considerations 
The CellCast Alerts Message Broker System is a combination of 
hardware and telecommunications equipment that resides at a 
location selected by the purchaser as well as within the carriers.  The 
Cellcast Alerts Message Broker acts as a 
gateway broker aggregator system and can tie in any infrastructure 
that the government sees as relevant from the same management 
system.. Messages can be received for broadcast and passed on to 
other systems in CAP format. Additional formats can be implemented 
on request.  
A diagram of a standard system is shown below.  
CellCast Alert System Configuration: 
 
Duplicate CellCast Alerts Message Brokers™ can be set up at 
geographically separate sites and connected by redundant 
communications methods thus ensuring a high availability rate. 
The CellCast Alerts Message Broker™ is designed to provide an 
interface to new technologies (e.g. 4G cellular) as they arise and uses 
open standard Common Alert Protocol (CAP). 
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Speed A message can usually be created and the broadcast started in the 
time taken to write the message, vendor estimates less than 2 
minutes. For pre-defined messages and target areas this time can is 
reduced. 
For time to user it depends on the message type and equipment 
configuration. For cell broadcast it is possible to transmit 
approximately 90 characters every 1.8 seconds.  For mass scale 
public alerting by cell broadcast each message can reach an unlimited 
number of recipients within about 20 seconds, 32 of such messages 
can be sent per minute. 
Reach Because of the range of broadcast methods as well as the different 
cell broadcast channel capability it is possible to reach most sectors of 
the community at the same time, therefore it is socially flat. A multi 
language capability is provided so that non-English speakers can be 
catered for at the discretion of the sending authority. 
For blind people a voice message can be sent instead of a text based 
one, however this would have to be on an “opt in” basis. This will not 
necessarily be geo-specific as they may have travelled away from the 
area that they registered for but it will be better than not receiving the 
message at all. Alternatively blind people could be “opted in” to all 
warnings.  
Costs Refer Appendix 5. 
Strengths Key strengths are: 
That the mobile solution works in  overload situations and therefore 
has ongoing effectiveness through events 
Does not require the storing of mobile numbers 
Caters for a wide range of the community including those that don’t 
speak English 
Fast sending rates 
Weaknesses  Subject to the same weaknesses as general Cell Broadcast: 
Users have to enable functionality on their handset, the elderly in 
particular may be less inclined to do this. This would therefore require 
a public education programme. 
Not all handsets are enabled with cell broadcast functionality 
National standards would have to be set around emergency channels 
 The fact that this particular vendor is overseas would need to be 
considered for ongoing maintenance requirements.  
Implementatio
n 
considerations 
The vendor states that it takes approximately three months for the 
infrastructure deployment.  
As with the other alerting systems governance structures and 
authorisation procedures would need to be established.  CellCast can 
assist by engaging the various interested parties (government, 
telecommunications providers, system vendors) to set the terms of the 
Memorandum of Understanding  while CellCast subsequently 
programs them as admission rules in the CellCast Alerts Message 
Broker™ 
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APPENDIX 4: Partial and/or Opt-In Integrated Public Alerting 
Systems 
 
Appendix 4a: Western Australian State Alert System 
 
Description The Fire and Emergency Services Authority of Western Australia (FESA) 
and the Western Australian Police collaborated to develop a public 
warning system with an independent developer, OVIS.  It is a web based 
system capable of transmitting voice and/or text messages via landline, 
mobile phone, email and fax.  It is a free service to the community and all 
publicly listed telephone numbers in the phone book are automatically 
registered in the database. Anyone with an unlisted number or who wants 
to receive StateAlerts via the alternative methods can register via a 
website or call centre.  Three registrations are allowed per address. 
The public register their mobile number against their home address, so 
they can receive alerts about their home area to their mobile phone. This 
is not a fully localised solution, in that if the user goes out of their home 
area they will not receive information on the area they are within currently. 
As with most of the other systems that offer voice services it has an 
integrated voice recording function. It has an Area Manager function that 
allows target areas to be defined from the size of a suburban block to as 
large as a local government district.  
System specifics: 
Voice messages of up to two minutes 
SMS maximum of 160 characters 
Email/fax maximum of 1000 characters 
Will leave messages on answering machines 
Will call each number up to three times 
It has been in development for two years and has undergone user testing 
in a live trial. The system is ready for implementation and public launch 
but has to wait until privacy legislation around phone number use is 
changed.  
Infrastructure 
considerations 
Dependent on how it is implemented in the New Zealand context and the 
underlying New Zealand telecommunications infrastructure. 
Speed  40,000 messages in 15 minutes in normal conditions.  
Reach Dependent on how it is implemented in the New Zealand context but 
subject to the same reach issues as discussed under SMS and voice 
technology. 
Costs FESA owns the software rights and therefore would be happy to work 
with the New Zealand government to establish a purchase agreement.  
Strengths Key strengths are: 
Development and testing has been completed and therefore 
implementation timeframes would not be considerable. 
Weaknesses  Key weaknesses are: 
The opt in solution for mobiles reduces the population coverage.  
Maintenance support would be from an overseas provider however a 
relatively close one.  
Implementation Implementation timeframes once an agreement has been come to and 
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considerations the supporting environment is in place would not be significant. 
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Appendix 4b: OPTn (Rocom) 
 
Description OPTn is an SMS based service provided by Rocom. It has a web 
based user interface that allows text messages to be sent to users 
that “opt in” to receive the service on their mobile phone.    
Standard SMS message characteristics apply of the alert being 
received as per the user’s settings e.g. vibration, sound and160 
characters in each alert. More characters can be rolled into a 
subsequent message. The picture below shows how a message might 
look. 
 
Members can opt in automatically by texting the appropriate code to 
OPTn and manually either by phoning an 0800 number, on the web or 
faxing Rocom. They have a large number of schools that are 
collecting parent’s numbers and on-sending them, Civil Defence 
offices are also collecting numbers. A variety of methods to opt in are 
required as some users such as the elderly do not like to text. For 
manual registrations Rocom need to physically enter the mobile phone 
numbers into the system. 
This service is available in New Zealand and Australia with seven 
councils in NZ using the OPTn service, with Waitakere City Council 
and Northshore City Council soon to join.   
Pre-programmed messages are possible but it would need 
Telecommunication provider setup and approval. Single level 
authentication is provided. 
Rocom states they could develop a fixed line tool relatively easily as it 
is very similar technology. Rocom estimated it would cost under 
$100,000.  For this service each council would have to further 
delineate code boundaries within their area up to a level of granularity 
that they wanted to be able to bound their alerts to. 
Infrastructure 
considerations 
OPTn is a series of databases relating to an area code e.g. Lahar or 
RDCD (Rodney district civil defence) on highly available servers 
currently hosted by iServe in Wellington NZ. These databases are 
connected to the Rocom SMS Gateway (GiMP) hosted in Datacom, 
Auckland, NZ.  The gateway is directly connected over Datacom’s 
permanent data links with the NZ mobile carriers to deliver the SMS 
alert to mobile users who have “opted –in”. 
Both the OPTn servers and the SMS gateway are single points of 
failure. Rocom is currently looking at bringing the Wellington server to 
Datacom in Auckland and also having a Technology Recovery system 
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offshore.  
Speed The carriers (Vodafone and Telecom) currently govern the GiMP’s 
throughput to 10-15 messages per second, 600 messages per minute, 
36,000 per hour. The GiMP has the ability to send 185 per second per 
server.  
This could be boosted with the agreement of the carriers to the 
carrier’s maximum. 
Time required to access the system and send an alert message is 
minimal.  
Reach Rocom estimates that 98% of mobile phones currently in use can 
receive text messages.  Internal or overseas visitors would need to opt 
in to the service to receive it.  
Costs Opting in and out is free to the user. Rocom currently charges 
Councils $25 per month with SMS costs at 15c per SMS sent. If it is to 
be used as a national public alerting tool Rocom suggests building 
better redundancy, interfacing with Government systems, reporting 
functionality etc... Their broad estimates would be in the range of 
NZD$100,000 to$ 200,000. 
With the additional redundancy maintenance costs are estimated at 
$4-7000 per month which could be split between MCDEM and the 
Civil Defence Emergency Management Groups. 
Strengths Key strengths are: 
A number of areas are currently using the OPTn service with some 
public having already received an SMS from Civil Defence. This 
creates a level of familiarity by the councils and the public.   
Technical support is based in New Zealand  
They have a long history and experience of working with the New 
Zealand telecommunication carriers. 
Emergency Managers can also send a text to the public from their 
phone.  
Weaknesses  Key weaknesses are: 
Subject to the same weaknesses as general SMS.  
The areas around NZ must be divided into codes.  This does however 
provide traffic management and helps to ensure that the people first 
affected will receive the alert. This is a preventative congestion control 
measure only and does not stop congestion from occurring if all users 
decided to call/text each other. 
Having the public opt in to the service reduces population coverage.  
Emergency managers can currently send messages from their mobile 
phone, which if the phone is stolen could be used maliciously.  This 
functionality could be turned off. 
Implementation 
considerations 
Government would need to define the areas and codes for the system. 
This could be done relatively easily using existing council boundaries. 
Significant amounts of public education would be required to get 
sufficient levels of population coverage. 
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Appendix 4c: Whispir  
 
Description Provided by an Australian based company, Whispir is a ‘high 
availability messaging platform’  that enables the instant and 
automatic invocation of communications across email, SMS, web and 
voice channels, from any location  including from a mobile phone.  
Provided as a managed service, this wireless and web-based 
communication management system facilitates invocation, collation, 
distribution and delivery of communications during an incident or crisis 
without having to install or maintain any software or hardware. 
It has a user friendly interface and advanced message tracking and 
reporting features to monitor message delivery and response in real 
time. Text can be turned into voice and automated voice calls sent. 
Teleconferences can be invoked with a call out process removing the 
need to dial long numbers and remember account codes and pins. 
Flexible message templates for pre-approved communications are 
able to be input. It has rules based message escalation processes e.g. 
it send messages automatically to a person’s alternate if they do not 
respond to a message within a pre-defined time frame.  
It utilises message delivery reports to manage communications by 
exception.  Reports available in real-time that provide a complete 
record of all communications in a single location for all communication 
methods.  
Opt-in subscription interfaces are available for subscription services if 
desirable in certain circumstances. Customer information data tables 
reside in Whispir’s hosted in data centres, containing the hardware, 
software, data and networking, upgrades, and maintenance in a fully 
managed, secure environment.  Clients are responsible for managing 
their own data 
Infrastructure 
considerations 
An edge-of-network IP based fully hosted solution.  
Speed Standard configuration up to 3000 messages per minute. Optimised 
configuration with telecommunication carrier integration up to 5000 
messages per second. 
Reach Equivalent to standard voice and SMS.  
Costs Refer Appendix 5. 
Strengths Key strengths of the Whispir system are:  
Whispir has several years experience in Australia and is rapidly 
expanding into the New Zealand market, therefore it has or will have 
shortly knowledge and experience of working with local 
telecommunication carriers.   
User friendly interface and advance reporting over a number of 
communication methods. 
It has advanced API’s that enables integration of the Whispir platform 
with other systems. 
It supports advanced teams and distribution list management 
incorporating time profiles, recipient defined message preferences and 
escalation. 
Capacity planning ensures that service level obligations are met. 
Can send alerts from a mobile phone.  
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Weaknesses  Key weaknesses are: 
Infrastructure and maintenance teams not currently held within New 
Zealand, therefore reliant on Southern Cross cable and support teams 
coming from Australia. Whispir is looking to resolve this in the next 6 
months.  
Whispir does not currently provide mass public alerting capability i.e. it 
still needs to be integrated with: 
A location area manager (Whispir has developed but is not in use with 
any clients as yet) 
A fixed line number database (Primarily Government’s responsibility) 
A way of locating mobile phone numbers in an area (Still required) 
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APPENDIX 5: Relevant Legislation and Commentary 
 
Appendix 5a: Telecommunications Act 2001 
Sections of the Telecommunications Act included here describe the processes used to 
invoke a new code and amend or remove an existing one. Sections describing the process 
for the Commissioner to create a code have not been included. Where appropriate, 
explanatory comments have been provided 
 
Section Comment 
Schedule 2 - Telecommunications access codes s 7(2) 
1 Telecommunications access codes prepared by Forum 
This heading was inserted, as from 22 December 2006, by section 57 
Telecommunications Amendment Act (No 2) 2006 (2006 No 83). 
 
The Forum referred to here is 
the Telecommunication Carriers 
Forum (TCF) 
1 Forum may prepare code 
(1) The Forum may, on its own initiative or if invited to do so by the 
Commission, prepare 1 or more telecommunications access codes for 
approval by the Commission. 
(2) The Commission may issue guidelines to the Forum on any matters 
relating to telecommunications access codes, including advice on what 
matters are appropriately dealt with by those codes. 
Subclause (2) was inserted, as from 22 December 2006, by section 57 
Telecommunications Amendment Act (No 2) 2006 (2006 No 83). 
The TCF, rather than the 
Commissioner, would likely be 
engaged in the preparation of a 
code to provide the information 
required to sustain a public 
warning system. 
 Requirements for draft codes for designated access services and specified 
services 
(1) A draft code for 1 or more designated access services or specified 
services may only provide for procedures, requirements, and other matters, 
not inconsistent with this Act, that relate to an aspect or aspects of the supply 
of that service or those services. 
(2) A draft code to which subclause (1) applies must— 
(a) be consistent with applicable access principles and any regulations made 
in respect of the applicable access principles; and 
(b) be consistent with the purpose set out in section 18; and 
(c) comply with the Commerce Act 1986; and 
(d) not directly provide for the implementation of initial and final pricing 
principles and any regulations relating to those principles. 
Subclause (1) was substituted, as from 22 December 2006, by section 57 
Telecommunications Amendment Act (No 2) 2006 (2006 No 83). 
 
 Requirements for draft codes for designated multi-network services 
(1) A draft code for 1 or more designated multi-network services may only 
provide for procedures, requirements, and other matters, not inconsistent 
with this Act, in respect of— 
(a) the functions that must be performed by a system for determining the 
service: 
(b) the standard to which those functions must be performed. 
(2) A draft code to which subclause (1) applies must— 
(a) be consistent with the purpose set out in section 18; and 
(b) comply with the Commerce Act 1986; and 
(c) not directly provide for the apportionment of the cost of delivering the 
service between the access seeker and all access providers of the service. 
 
3A Requirements for draft codes for services supplied under registered 
undertaking 
(1) A draft code for 1 or more services supplied under a registered 
undertaking may only provide for procedures, requirements, and other 
matters, not inconsistent with this Act, that relate to an aspect or aspects of 
The code for provision of number 
–location data will comply with 
this section and not require the 
provision or disclosure of any 
commercial or pricing 
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Section Comment 
the supply of that service or those services. 
(2) A draft code to which subclause (1) applies must— 
(a) be consistent with the purpose set out in section 18; and 
(b) comply with the Commerce Act 1986; and 
(c) not provide for any matter relating to the price of the service. 
Clause 3A was inserted, as from 22 December 2006, by section 57 
Telecommunications Amendment Act (No 2) 2006 (2006 No 83). 
information. 
Rigour is required in establishing 
the security of a compiled 
database so that it is unavailable 
in its entirety or part thereof for 
any of the TCF members except 
to verify the content of 
information by a member of the 
information that it provided. 
 Forum must arrange referendum on draft code 
(1) Before a draft code is submitted to the Commission for approval, the 
Forum must hold a referendum on the draft code. 
(2) The Forum must take all practicable steps to invite, for the purpose of 
voting on a draft code, all eligible persons who are, in the opinion of the 
Commission, affected or likely to be affected by the draft code. 
(3) The Forum may otherwise determine the way in which the referendum is 
conducted. 
(3A) All eligible persons who are, in the opinion of the Commission, affected 
or likely to be affected by the draft code may vote in the referendum. 
(4) The following persons are entitled to register with the Commission as 
eligible persons: 
(a) a person who provides a telecommunications service by means of some 
component of a PSTN or PDN that is operated by that person: 
(b) an access seeker or access provider of— 
(i) a designated service or specified service; or 
(ii) a service supplied under a registered undertaking: 
(c) any other person whom the Commission determines has a material 
interest in a draft code because that person is about to become, within the 
foreseeable future, a person referred to in paragraph (a) or (b). 
(5) A person entitled to register with the Commission under subclause (4) 
may be a member of the Forum for the purposes of this Act. 
Subclauses (2) and (3) were substituted, as from 22 December 2006, by 
section 57 Telecommunications Amendment Act (No 2) 2006 (2006 No 83). 
Subclause (3A) was inserted, as from 22 December 2006, by section 57 
Telecommunications Amendment Act (No 2) 2006 (2006 No 83). 
Subclause (4) was substituted, as from 22 December 2006, by section 57 
Telecommunications Amendment Act (No 2) 2006 (2006 No 83). 
This section speaks to the 
process that any new code will 
have to endure in order to be 
approved and applied. 
 Draft code may be submitted to Commission 
The Forum may submit to the Commission a draft code, along with a 
statement— 
(a) that identifies the designated service or specified service to which the 
draft code applies; and 
(b) that identifies every relevant applicable access principle; and 
(c) that the draft code meets all the requirements set out in clause 2 or 
clause 3 or clause 3A (as the case may require); and 
(d) that either the draft code— 
(i) has the support of all eligible persons who voted on the draft code; or 
(ii) is supported by at least 75% of eligible persons who voted on the draft 
code; and 
(e) that identifies any cost implications in relation to the draft code; and 
(f) that indicates how any cost will be apportioned between eligible persons 
to whom the draft code applies; and 
(g) that sets out how the apportionment is consistent with the purpose set out 
in section 18. 
Paragraph (c) was amended, as from 22 December 2006, by section 57 
Telecommunications Amendment Act (No 2) 2006 (2006 No 83) by inserting 
the words “or clause 3A” after the expression “clause 3”. 
 
Consideration should be given to 
the cost (e) of operating the code 
to provide the necessary 
information. 
 
 
MCDEM may wish to discuss 
this with MED. MED are 
currently guiding the work of the 
TCF to develop a code entitled 
“Emergency Services Calling 
Code” 
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Paragraph (d) was substituted, as from 22 December 2006, by section 57 
Telecommunications Amendment Act (No 2) 2006 (2006 No 83). 
6 Commission must consider whether consultation on draft code is needed 
(1) The Commission must make reasonable efforts to consider whether or 
not consultation on the draft code is needed not later than 10 working days 
after the date on which the Commission received the draft code. 
(2) The Commission need not do any of the things set out in clause 7(1) if the 
Commission is satisfied that the Forum has— 
(a) published a notice of the draft code, or caused a notice of the draft code 
to be published, in the Gazette; and 
(b) at all reasonable times, made the draft code available for inspection on 
the Forum's website in an electronic form that is publicly accessible; and 
(c) included in the notice of the draft code the closing date for submissions, 
which must not be later than 20 working days after the date of giving the 
notice in the Gazette; and 
(d) given to the Commission copies of all submissions on the draft report. 
 
7 Consultation process on draft code 
(1) Immediately after the Commission considers that consultation on the draft 
code is needed, the Commission— 
(a) may request the Forum to consult with any person or group specified by 
the Commission: 
(b) must consult with every eligible person who has voted against the draft 
code; and 
(c) must give public notice of the draft code. 
(2) A person is entitled to make submissions to the Commission not later 
than 20 working days after the date on which public notice of the draft code is 
given. 
Sufficient time, probably months, 
should be allowed for the 
consultation and submission 
process. 
 Variation of draft code 
(1AA) This clause applies if the draft code has been prepared by the Forum 
under clause 1. 
(1) The Commission must make reasonable efforts to consider whether or 
not the draft code meets all of the requirements set out in clause 2 or clause 
3 or clause 3A (as the case may require) at least 20, but not later than 40, 
working days after the closing date for submissions under clause 7(2). 
(2) If the Commission considers that the draft code does not meet all of the 
requirements set out in clause 2 or clause 3 or clause 3A (as the case may 
require), the Commission— 
(a) must not approve the draft code; and 
(b) must return to the Forum the draft code, along with the Commission's 
reasons why the draft code does not meet a particular requirement; and 
(c) must, if the draft code does not comply with the Commerce Act 1986, 
advise the Forum that an authorisation granted by the Commission in 
accordance with that Act is needed before the draft code may be approved 
under this Act. 
(3) If the Forum resubmits the draft code to the Commission, clauses 1 to 7 
and subclauses (1) and (2) again apply to the resubmitted code. 
Subclause (1AA) was inserted before subclause (1), as from 22 December 
2006, by section 57 Telecommunications Amendment Act (No 2) 2006 (2006 
No 83). 
Subclauses (1) and (2) were amended , as from 22 December 2006, by 
section 57 Telecommunications Amendment Act (No 2) 2006 (2006 No 83) 
by inserting the words “or clause 3A” after the expression “clause 3”. 
 
 When Commission must approve draft code 
[Repealed] 
Clause 9 was repealed, as from 22 December 2006, by section 57 
Telecommunications Amendment Act (No 2) 2006 (2006 No 83). 
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10 Commission's discretion to approve draft code 
The Commission may approve a draft code if the Commission is satisfied 
that— 
(a) the draft code meets all the requirements set out in clause 2 or clause 3 
or clause 3A (as the case may require); and 
(b) all the consultation referred to in clause 7(1) has been carried out; and 
(c) [Repealed] 
Paragraph (a) was amended, as from 22 December 2006, by section 57 
Telecommunications Amendment Act (No 2) 2006 (2006 No 83) by inserting 
the words “or clause 3A” after the expression “clause 3”. 
Paragraph (c) was repealed, as from 22 December 2006, by section 57 
Telecommunications Amendment Act (No 2) 2006 (2006 No 83). 
 
 Commission must refuse to approve draft code in certain cases 
Despite clauses 9 and 10, the Con-mission must refuse to approve a draft 
code if it is satisfied that the draft code deals with a matter that is more 
appropriately dealt with in— 
(a) a determination under section 27; or 
(b) a standard terms determination under section 30M; or 
(c) a designated multinetwork service determination under section 39. 
Clauses 10A and 10B were inserted, as from 22 December 2006, by section 
57 Telecommunications Amendment Act (No 2) 2006 (2006 No 83). 
 
10B Amendment of draft code 
(1) This clause applies only if the Commission considers that, because of a 
change in circumstances, a draft code submitted to it no longer meets all the 
requirements set out in clause 2 or clause 3 or clause 3A (as the case may 
require). 
(2) The Commission may prepare, or request the Forum to prepare, a 
specific amendment to the draft code to ensure that it meets all of those 
requirements. 
(3) If the Commission prepares the amendment, the Commission must— 
(a) ensure that the consultation referred to in clause 7(1) has been carried 
out on the amended draft code; and 
(b) decide, as soon as practicable after paragraph (a) has been complied 
with, whether to approve the amended draft code under clause 10. 
Clauses 10A and 10B were inserted, as from 22 December 2006, by section 
57 Telecommunications Amendment Act (No 2) 2006 (2006 No 83). 
 
11 Expiry of approved code 
(1) An approved code expires, in whole or part (as the case may be), on the 
revocation of the relevant applicable access principle. 
(2) An approved code expires on the revocation or expiry of the designated 
service or specified service to which the approved code applies. 
 
12 Revocation of approved codes 
(1) The Commission must, on the request of all eligible persons, revoke an 
approved code. 
(2) The Commission may revoke an approved code if— 
(a) requested to do so by 75% of eligible persons who voted on the approved 
code; and 
(b) the Commission considers that, because of a change in circumstances, 
an approved code no longer meets all the requirements set out in clause 2 or 
clause 3 or clause 3A (as the case may require). 
(3) Despite subclause (2), the Commission may revoke an approved code if it 
is satisfied that to do so best gives, or is likely to best give, effect to the 
purpose set out in section 18. 
Subclause (2)(a) was substituted, as from 22 December 2006, by section 57 
Telecommunications Amendment Act (No 2) 2006 (2006 No 83). 
Subclause (2)(b) was amended, as from 22 December 2006, by section 57 
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Telecommunications Amendment Act (No 2) 2006 (2006 No 83) by inserting 
the words “or clause 3A” after the expression “clause 3”. 
Subclause (3) was inserted, as from 22 December 2006, by section 57 
Telecommunications Amendment Act (No 2) 2006 (2006 No 83). 
Amendment of approved codes 
An approved code may be— 
(a) amended in the same manner that it was approved; or 
(b) amended by the Commission in accordance with clause 14. 
 
 Amendment of approved code initiated by Commission 
This clause and clause 13 apply only if the Commission considers that, 
because of a change in circumstances, an approved code no longer meets 
all the requirements set out in clause 2 or clause 3 or clause 3A (as the case 
may require). 
The Commission may request the Forum to prepare a specific amendment to 
an approved code for submission to it within a specified time. 
If the Forum complies with the Commission's request under subclause (2), 
the same procedure that applies to draft codes must be followed. 
Subclause (1) was amended, as from 22 December 2006, by section 57 
Telecommunications Amendment Act (No 2) 2006 (2006 No 83) by 
substituting the word “clause” for the word “section”. 
Subclause (1) was amended, as from 22 December 2006, by section 57 
Telecommunications Amendment Act (No 2) 2006 (2006 No 83) by inserting 
the words “or clause 3A” after the expression “clause 3”. 
 
15 Consequences of not complying with Commission's request under clause 
14(2) 
(1) If the Forum does not comply within a reasonable period with the 
Commission's request under clause 14(2), the Commission may prepare the 
amendment. 
(2) If the Commission prepares the amendment, the Commission must— 
(a) ensure that— 
(i) the amendment meets all the requirements set out in clause 2 or clause 3 
or clause 3A (as the case may require); and 
(ii) the consultation referred to in clause 7(1) has been carried out; and 
(b) approve the amendment as soon as practicable after paragraph (a) has 
been complied with. 
Subclause (2)(a) was amended, as from 22 December 2006, by section 57 
Telecommunications Amendment Act (No 2) 2006 (2006 No 83) by inserting 
the words “or clause 3A” after the expression “clause 3”. 
 
16 Public notice of approved codes 
The Commission must give public notice of— 
every approved code; and 
every revocation of an approved code. 
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Appendix 5b: Privacy Act 1993 No 28 (as at 01 August 2008), Public 
Act 
Section Comment 
4  Actions of, and disclosure of information to, staff of agency, etc 
For the purposes of this Act, an action done by, or information disclosed to, 
a person employed by, or in the service of, an agency in the performance of 
the duties of the person's employment shall be treated as having been done 
by, or disclosed to, the agency. 
If the agency is MCDEM then one 
person at MCDEM having received 
personal information is deemed to 
have received it on behalf of all of 
MCDEM 
 6 Information privacy principles 
The information privacy principles are as follows: 
Information Privacy Principles 
Principle 1 Purpose of collection of personal information 
Personal information shall not be collected by any agency unless— 
(a) The information is collected for a lawful purpose connected with a 
function or activity of the agency; and 
(b) The collection of the information is necessary for that purpose. 
Agreement is needed that the 
interests of the individual resident or 
traveller are served by the collection 
of information of a personal nature in 
order to facilitate receipt of an 
emergency warning. 
See principle 10 (d) 
Principle 2 Source of personal information 
(1) Where an agency collects personal information, the agency shall collect 
the information directly from the individual concerned. 
(2) It is not necessary for an agency to comply with subclause (1) of this 
principle if the agency believes, on reasonable grounds,— 
(a) That the information is publicly available information; or 
(b) That the individual concerned authorises collection of the information 
from someone else; or 
(c) That non-compliance would not prejudice the interests of the individual 
concerned; or 
(d) That non-compliance is necessary— 
(i) To avoid prejudice to the maintenance of the law by any public sector 
agency, including the prevention, detection, investigation, prosecution, and 
punishment of offences; or 
(ii) For the enforcement of a law imposing a pecuniary penalty; or 
(iii) For the protection of the public revenue; or 
(iv) For the conduct of proceedings before any court or tribunal (being 
proceedings that have been commenced or are reasonably in 
contemplation); or 
Principle 2 subclause (2)(d)(iv) was amended, as from 3 September 1996, 
by section 3 Privacy Amendment Act 1996 (1996 No 142) by substituting 
the word “tribunal” for the word “Tribunal”. 
(e) That compliance would prejudice the purposes of the collection; or 
(f) That compliance is not reasonably practicable in the circumstances of 
the particular case; or 
(g) That the information— 
(i) Will not be used in a form in which the individual concerned is identified; 
or 
(ii) Will be used for statistical or research purposes and will not be published 
in a form that could reasonably be expected to identify the individual 
concerned; or 
(h) That the collection of the information is in accordance with an authority 
granted under section 54 of this Act. 
2 (a) Information that is publicly 
available would include a] directories 
and b] property information  
Omissions for a] will include all 
unlisted numbers and for b] all 
instances where the property owner 
has invoked the option to suppress 
property owner details in on-line 
property descriptions. 
2 (g) (i) begs a decision by the 
Privacy Commissioner on whether 
the association of a telephone 
number with an address is regarded 
as personal information when the 
identity of an individual, family or 
organisation that uses the telephone 
number is not part of the information 
record. 
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Principle 3 Collection of information from subject 
(1) Where an agency collects personal information directly from the 
individual concerned, the agency shall take such steps (if any) as are, in the 
circumstances, reasonable to ensure that the individual concerned is aware 
of— 
(a) The fact that the information is being collected; and 
(b) The purpose for which the information is being collected; and 
(c) The intended recipients of the information; and 
(d) The name and address of— 
(i) The agency that is collecting the information; and 
(ii) The agency that will hold the information; and 
(e) If the collection of the information is authorised or required by or under 
law,— 
(i) The particular law by or under which the collection of the information is 
so authorised or required; and 
(ii) Whether or not the supply of the information by that individual is 
voluntary or mandatory; and 
(f) The consequences (if any) for that individual if all or any part of the 
requested information is not provided; and 
(g) The rights of access to, and correction of, personal information provided 
by these principles. 
(2) The steps referred to in subclause (1) of this principle shall be taken 
before the information is collected or, if that is not practicable, as soon as 
practicable after the information is collected. 
(3) An agency is not required to take the steps referred to in subclause (1) 
of this principle in relation to the collection of information from an individual 
if that agency has taken those steps in relation to the collection, from that 
individual, of the same information or information of the same kind, on a 
recent previous occasion. 
(4) It is not necessary for an agency to comply with subclause (1) of this 
principle if the agency believes, on reasonable grounds,— 
(a) That non-compliance is authorised by the individual concerned; or 
(b) That non-compliance would not prejudice the interests of the individual 
concerned; or 
(c) That non-compliance is necessary— 
(i) To avoid prejudice to the maintenance of the law by any public sector 
agency, including the prevention, detection, investigation, prosecution, and 
punishment of offences; or 
(ii) For the enforcement of a law imposing a pecuniary penalty; or 
(iii) For the protection of the public revenue; or 
(iv) For the conduct of proceedings before any court or tribunal (being 
proceedings that have been commenced or are reasonably in 
contemplation); or 
Principle 3 subclause (4)(c)(iv) was amended, as from 3 September 1996, 
by section 3 Privacy Amendment Act 1996 (1996 No 142) by substituting 
the word “tribunal” for the word “Tribunal”. 
(d) That compliance would prejudice the purposes of the collection; or 
(e) That compliance is not reasonably practicable in the circumstances of 
the particular case; or 
(f) That the information— 
(i) Will not be used in a form in which the individual concerned is identified; 
or 
(ii) Will be used for statistical or research purposes and will not be published 
in a form that could reasonably be expected to identify the individual 
concerned. 
Any opt-in component of a public 
warning system must adhere to this 
principle including anywhere only 
certain parts of the population 
provide information because of their 
special circumstances and need for 
either a different message channel or 
assistance in certain types of 
emergency. 
All opt-in systems that are currently 
in use should have been reviewed 
and shown to be compliant under 
this section. 
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Principle 4 Manner of collection of personal information 
Personal information shall not be collected by an agency— 
(a) By unlawful means; or 
(b) By means that, in the circumstances of the case,— 
(i) Are unfair; or 
(ii) Intrude to an unreasonable extent upon the personal affairs of the 
individual concerned. 
The number and associated address 
will require daily extracts from 
telecommunication company 
databases to enable moves, adds, 
changes and deletions.  
Principle 5 Storage and security of personal information 
An agency that holds personal information shall ensure— 
(a) That the information is protected, by such security safeguards as it is 
reasonable in the circumstances to take, against— 
(i) Loss; and 
(ii) Access, use, modification, or disclosure, except with the authority of the 
agency that holds the information; and 
(iii) Other misuse; and 
(b) That if it is necessary for the information to be given to a person in 
connection with the provision of a service to the agency, everything 
reasonably within the power of the agency is done to prevent unauthorised 
use or unauthorised disclosure of the information. 
This is a condition for the agency 
that manages the database and any 
information that is sent in or out or 
processed. 
5 (b) will have to be complied with by 
any extract from the database used 
for sending and resending messages 
to numbers that are identified to be 
within the area of concern. 
Principle 6 Access to personal information 
(1) Where an agency holds personal information in such a way that it can 
readily be retrieved, the individual concerned shall be entitled— 
(a) To obtain from the agency confirmation of whether or not the agency 
holds such personal information; and 
(b) To have access to that information. 
(2) Where, in accordance with subclause (1)(b) of this principle, an 
individual is given access to personal information, the individual shall be 
advised that, under principle 7, the individual may request the correction of 
that information. 
(3) The application of this principle is subject to the provisions of Parts 4 
and 5 of this Act. 
Individual access to database 
information can be limited by system 
design to automate the process of 
message distribution with only those 
addresses not reached being viewed 
in an exception report. 
This Principle is less of an issue if 
the Privacy Commission rules that 
the linking of phone numbers to 
physical address and geospatial data 
does not fall within the meaning of 
personal information. 
Principle 7 Correction of personal information 
(1) Where an agency holds personal information, the individual concerned 
shall be entitled— 
(a) To request correction of the information; and 
(b) To request that there be attached to the information a statement of the 
correction sought but not made. 
(2) An agency that holds personal information shall, if so requested by the 
individual concerned or on its own initiative, take such steps (if any) to 
correct that information as are, in the circumstances, reasonable to ensure 
that, having regard to the purposes for which the information may lawfully 
be used, the information is accurate, up to date, complete, and not 
misleading. 
(3) Where an agency that holds personal information is not willing to correct 
that information in accordance with a request by the individual concerned, 
the agency shall, if so requested by the individual concerned, take such 
steps (if any) as are reasonable in the circumstances to attach to the 
information, in such a manner that it will always be read with the 
information, any statement provided by that individual of the correction 
sought. 
(4) Where the agency has taken steps under subclause (2) or subclause (3) 
of this principle, the agency shall, if reasonably practicable, inform each 
person or body or agency to whom the personal information has been 
disclosed of those steps. 
(5) Where an agency receives a request made pursuant to subclause (1) of 
this principle, the agency shall inform the individual concerned of the action 
taken as a result of the request. 
 
Anticipating that individuals or 
organisations may be asked to 
provide information when an 
individual or group condition requires 
a special message channel or 
assistance, there will need to be a 
proactive process for ensuring that 
the information is kept up to date.  
This is to ensure that resources are 
not misdirected by the relocation or 
other changes in circumstances. 
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Principle 8 Accuracy, etc, of personal information to be checked before use 
An agency that holds personal information shall not use that information 
without taking such steps (if any) as are, in the circumstances, reasonable 
to ensure that, having regard to the purpose for which the information is 
proposed to be used, the information is accurate, up to date, complete, 
relevant, and not misleading. 
 
As per comment to Principle 7 
Principle 9 Agency not to keep personal information for longer than 
necessary 
An agency that holds personal information shall not keep that information 
for longer than is required for the purposes for which the information may 
lawfully be used. 
Maintenance processes will need to 
include options to delete (not 
archive) information that no longer 
applies or where an individual or 
group opts not to have special needs 
information stored. 
In the latter instance the subscriber 
should be asked to sign a disclaimer 
absolving MCDEM of any 
responsibility if the conditions that 
led to inclusion of information still 
exist when it is removed.  It should 
be widely publicised that opt-in is 
mandatory  for those with special 
needs to ensure appropriate actions 
by emergency services. 
Principle 10 Limits on use of personal information 
An agency that holds personal information that was obtained in connection 
with one purpose shall not use the information for any other purpose unless 
the agency believes, on reasonable grounds,— 
(a) That the source of the information is a publicly available publication; or 
(b) That the use of the information for that other purpose is authorised by 
the individual concerned; or 
(c) That non-compliance is necessary— 
(i) To avoid prejudice to the maintenance of the law by any public sector 
agency, including the prevention, detection, investigation, prosecution, and 
punishment of offences; or 
(ii) For the enforcement of a law imposing a pecuniary penalty; or 
(iii) For the protection of the public revenue; or 
(iv) For the conduct of proceedings before any court or tribunal (being 
proceedings that have been commenced or are reasonably in 
contemplation); or 
Principle 10 paragraph (c)(iv) was amended, as from 3 September 1996, by 
section 3 Privacy Amendment Act 1996 (1996 No 142) by substituting the 
word “tribunal” for the word “Tribunal”. 
(d) That the use of the information for that other purpose is necessary to 
prevent or lessen a serious and imminent threat to— 
(i) Public health or public safety; or 
(ii) The life or health of the individual concerned or another individual; or 
(e) That the purpose for which the information is used is directly related to 
the purpose in connection with which the information was obtained; or 
(f) That the information— 
(i) Is used in a form in which the individual concerned is not identified; or 
(ii) Is used for statistical or research purposes and will not be published in a 
form that could reasonably be expected to identify the individual concerned; 
or 
(g) That the use of the information is in accordance with an authority 
granted under section 54 of this Act. 
Principle 10 (d) (ii) may grant 
sufficient authority for MCDEM to 
seek and keep information that will 
be useful to minimise risk to 
individuals, groups and emergency 
services. 
Refer to section 54 : “disclosure 
involves a clear benefit to the 
individual concerned that outweighs 
any interference with the privacy of 
the individual”. This provides 
direction to define the emergency 
circumstances that would lead to the 
use of private information to facilitate 
a warning to all individuals and 
groups in the area of concern as well 
as provide primary intelligence for 
people involved in evacuation, 
search and rescue operations.  
The addition of personal data that 
has been provided by the subscriber 
will inform the organisations who will 
be engaged in assisting people to 
leave the area of concern.  Further, 
availability of the personal 
information will allow emergency 
services to focus their resources. 
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Principle 11 Limits on disclosure of personal information 
An agency that holds personal information shall not disclose the information 
to a person or body or agency unless the agency believes, on reasonable 
grounds,— 
(a) That the disclosure of the information is one of the purposes in 
connection with which the information was obtained or is directly related to 
the purposes in connection with which the information was obtained; or 
(b) That the source of the information is a publicly available publication; or 
(c) That the disclosure is to the individual concerned; or 
(d) That the disclosure is authorised by the individual concerned; or 
(e) That non-compliance is necessary— 
(i) To avoid prejudice to the maintenance of the law by any public sector 
agency, including the prevention, detection, investigation, prosecution, and 
punishment of offences; or 
(ii) For the enforcement of a law imposing a pecuniary penalty; or 
(iii) For the protection of the public revenue; or 
(iv) For the conduct of proceedings before any court or tribunal (being 
proceedings that have been commenced or are reasonably in 
contemplation); or 
Principle 11 paragraph (e)(iv) was amended, as from 3 September 1996, by 
section 3 Privacy Amendment Act 1996 (1996 No 142) by substituting the 
word “tribunal” for the word “Tribunal”. 
(f) That the disclosure of the information is necessary to prevent or lessen a 
serious and imminent threat to— 
(i) Public health or public safety; or 
(ii) The life or health of the individual concerned or another individual; or 
(g) That the disclosure of the information is necessary to facilitate the sale 
or other disposition of a business as a going concern; or 
(h) That the information— 
(i) Is to be used in a form in which the individual concerned is not identified; 
or 
(ii) Is to be used for statistical or research purposes and will not be 
published in a form that could reasonably be expected to identify the 
individual concerned; or 
(iii) That the disclosure of the information is in accordance with an authority 
granted under section 54 of this Act. 
 
Any system will require access 
security to limit the use of information 
held in the database. 
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Principle 12 Unique identifiers 
(1) An agency shall not assign a unique identifier to an individual unless the 
assignment of that identifier is necessary to enable the agency to carry out 
any one or more of its functions efficiently. 
(2) An agency shall not assign to an individual a unique identifier that, to 
that agency's knowledge, has been assigned to that individual by another 
agency, unless those 2 agencies are associated persons within the 
meaning of subpart YB of the Income Tax Act 2007 (to the extent to which 
those rules apply for the whole of that Act excluding the 1973, 1988, and 
1990 version provisions). 
(3) An agency that assigns unique identifiers to individuals shall take all 
reasonable steps to ensure that unique identifiers are assigned only to 
individuals whose identity is clearly established. 
(4) An agency shall not require an individual to disclose any unique 
identifier assigned to that individual unless the disclosure is for one of the 
purposes in connection with which that unique identifier was assigned or for 
a purpose that is directly related to one of those purposes. 
Section 6 principle 12(2): amended, on 1 April 2008, by section ZA 2(1) of 
the Income Tax Act 2007 (2007 No 97). 
Subclause (2) was amended, as from 1 April 1995, by section YB 1 of the 
Income Tax Amendment Act 1994 (1994 No 164) by substituting the words 
“section OD 7 of the Income Tax Act 1994” for the words “section 8 of the 
Income Tax Act 1976”. 
Subclause (2) was amended, as from 1 April 2005, by section YA 2 Income 
Tax Act 2004 (2004 No 35) by substituting the words “Income Tax Act 
2004” for the words “Income Tax Act 1994”. 
 
The use of unique identifiers from 
other databases is not required to 
keep the minimum information 
needed to ensure the safety and well 
being of individuals and groups. 
In the recovery and restore phases 
of an emergency event there may be 
some use for welfare agencies, 
among others, for information that 
identifies the area of impact.  The 
location information could be used by 
other agencies to filter information 
from their own databases of client 
information to enable pro-active 
support actions.  It is not perceived 
that the provision of summary 
location information would 
contravene any provisions of this 
Act. 
54 Commissioner may authorise collection, use, or disclosure of personal 
information 
(1) The Commissioner may authorise an agency to collect, use, or disclose 
personal information, even though that collection, use, or disclosure would 
otherwise be in breach of principle 2 or principle 10 or principle 11, if the 
Commissioner is satisfied that, in the special circumstances of the case,— 
(a) The public interest in that collection or, as the case requires, that use or 
that disclosure outweighs, to a substantial degree, any interference with the 
privacy of the individual that could result from that collection or, as the case 
requires, that use or that disclosure; or 
(b) That collection or, as the case requires, that use or that disclosure 
involves a clear benefit to the individual concerned that outweighs any 
interference with the privacy of the individual that could result from that 
collection or, as the case requires, that use or that disclosure. 
(2) The Commissioner may impose in respect of any authority granted 
under subsection (1) of this section such conditions as the Commissioner 
thinks fit. 
(3) The Commissioner shall not grant an authority under subsection (1) of 
this section in respect of the collection, use, or disclosure of any personal 
information for any purpose if the individual concerned has refused to 
authorise the collection or, as the case requires, the use or disclosure of the 
information for that purpose. 
 
MCDEM can assist the 
Commissioner by defining the rules 
for collection, maintenance and use 
of information collected for the 
purposes of emergency 
management. 
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Appendix 5c: Mobile Premium Messaging Services Code 2008 
Section Comment 
4.1 Customer Consent required for all Premium Messaging 
Services 
All Premium Messaging Services must operate only on the basis of the 
Content Service Provider having received clear Customer consent from 
the Customer prior to the sending of any material to the Customer.  For 
material of a nature that is charged to the Customer’s mobile account, 
prior receipt of express consent is also required. 
Legislation may be required that 
prevents any subscriber from opting-
out from the public warning system 
4.2.4 Standardisation of ‘STOP’ command 
Content Service Providers must adopt standard procedures to enable 
Customers to: 
a) Unsubscribe from a Subscription Service; and 
b) Opt-out of marketing databases and the receipt of marketing / 
promotional material. 
The following ‘STOP’ command and opt out procedures must be 
available to Customers using the Subscription Services. 
Where a Customer unsubscribes from a Subscription Services or 
marketing material by telephone or some means other than their mobile 
phone, the Content Service Provider must comply with that request 
within 2 Working Days following receipt for requests to unsubscribe 
from that Subscription Service and within 5 Working Days of receipt for 
requests to unsubscribe from marketing material. 
 
4.1.3 Withdrawal of Consent 
Content Service Providers must implement appropriate, legally 
compliant procedures to enable the Customer to notify the Content 
Service Provider if they no longer wish to receive any type or category 
of messages. These procedures must be easy to use and must 
minimise any inconvenience or cost to the Customer. 
Any Customer notification or request must be complied with ideally 
within 10 minutes of receipt, but in any event no later than 2 Working 
Days. With the exception of the confirmation of having unsubscribed 
message, no further Messages may be sent to a Customer who has 
notified the Message originator of their wish to opt out, unless the 
Customer requests or consents to the receipt of further Messages. 
 
6.1 TSP Notifications  
When a Premium Messaging Service operating on a Shortcode is to be 
varied, which may include any or all of the following: 
a) Proposition offered on Shortcode; 
b) Pricepoints of Shortcode; 
c) Customer opt in/out procedures; 
d) Advertising mediums where there will be an impact to network 
through increased volumes; 
e) Customer service structures and contact details for the Content 
Provider; 
f) Change of content type or keywords; 
the Content Service Provider must give the Telecommunications 
Service Provider at least 30 days written notice of the variation(s). 
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Appendix 5d: Telecommunications Information Privacy Code 2003 
Section Comment 
I, BRUCE HOULTON SLANE, Privacy Commissioner, having given 
notice in accordance with section 48(1) of the Privacy Act 1993 of 
my intention to issue a code of practice and having satisfied the 
other requirements of the subsection, now issue under section 46 of 
the Act the Telecommunications Information Privacy Code 2003.  
Issued by me at Auckland on 2 May 2003 
Note: A code of practice issued under section 46 of the Privacy Act 
1993 is deemed to be a regulation for the purposes of the 
Regulations (Disallowance) Act 1989 – Privacy Act, s.50. 
This code follows the format and content 
of the privacy principles in the Privacy 
Act and will likely prove an enabler for 
the use of telecommunications 
information by MCDEM in emergency 
events. 
Existence of this code should shorten the 
time to create a code for use by MCDEM. 
reverse search facility means a directory which is arranged, or a 
directory enquiry service which is operated, for the purpose of 
enabling an individual’s name or address to be obtained by 
reference to a telephone number alone or an address alone, or a 
combination of telephone number and address 
Note: Used in Schedule 2. 
This explains simple use of a search key 
that facilitates access to telephone 
information for the area of concern.   
seamless means the provision of a telecommunications service in 
such a way that it is not evident to the subscriber that a particular 
service may be or has been delivered by different networks,  
equipment or providers 
Note: Used in rr.10(1)(h), 11(1)(l). 
 
subscriber information means personal information about a 
subscriber which is obtained by a telecommunications agency when 
that subscriber subscribes to a telecommunications service or during 
the term of such a contractual relationship 
Note: Used in the definition of reverse search facility”; cl. 4(1); r. 2(3); 
Schedule 2. 
 
4 Application of code 
(1) This code applies to information about an identifiable individual 
that is: 
(a) subscriber information; 
(b) traffic information; 
(c) the content of a telecommunication. 
Note: The code covers personal information collected or held by 
telecommunications agencies relating to individuals who subscribe 
to, or use, the telephone or other telecommunications services. The 
information privacy principles in the Privacy Act continue to apply to 
other personal information which is not listed here. Staff records are 
an example of personal information held by a telecommunications 
agency which is not covered by the code. 
Note: This information is collectively referred to in the code as 
“telecommunications information” – see cl.3. 
(2) This code applies to the following classes of agency: 
(a) a network operator; 
(b) a telecommunications service provider; 
(c) a directory publisher; 
(d) a directory enquiry agency; 
(e) an Internet service provider; 
(f) a call centre which provides call centre services on contract to 
another agency; 
(g) a mobile telephone retailer. 
Note: These agencies are collectively referred to as 
“telecommunications agencies” in the code – see cl. 3. 
A modified code for emergency services 
could further limit this list to (a) 
subscriber information though the 
absence of special needs data would 
make the database sub-optimal. 
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Rule 10 
Limits on use of Telecommunications Information 
(1) A telecommunications agency that holds telecommunications 
information that was obtained in connection with one purpose must 
not use the information for any other purpose unless the agency 
believes on reasonable grounds: 
d) that the use of the information for that other purpose is necessary 
to prevent or lessen a serious and imminent threat to: 
(i) public health or public safety; or 
(ii) the life or health of the individual concerned or another individual; 
(e) that the purpose for which the information is used is directly 
related to the purpose in connection with which the information was 
obtained; 
(f) that the information: 
(i) is used in a form in which the individual concerned is not 
identified; or 
(ii) is used for statistical or research purposes and will not be 
published in 
a form that could reasonably be expected to identify the individual 
concerned; 
(h) that the use of the information is necessary for: 
(i) the provision of a seamless telecommunications service to 
subscribers; 
 (h) may be a component if the 
identification of the message sender 
needs to be recognised across carriers to 
facilitate priority delivery 
Rule 11 
Limits on Disclosure of Telecommunications Information 
(g) that the disclosure of the information is necessary to prevent or 
lessen a serious and imminent threat to: 
(i) public health or public safety; or 
(ii) the life or health of the individual concerned or another individual; 
(h) that the disclosure is necessary to enable emergency services to 
respond to a potential threat to the life or health of the individual 
concerned or another individual; 
Modification required to enable the 
gathering of information prior to any 
event and maintained with geospatial 
and special needs data 
SCHEDULE 2 
DIRECTORIES AND DIRECTORY ENQUIRY SERVICES 
1 Any disclosure made under rule 11(1)(m) must be in accordance 
with: 
(a) the agency’s policy notified generally or to the subscriber 
concerned; 
Note: See clauses 6 and 7 below. 
(b) any authorisation given by the subscriber; and 
(c) clauses 2, 3, 7, 8 and 9. 
Note: See also r.2(2)(k). 
2 A network operator or Internet service provider must not make it a 
condition of supply of telecommunications services that subscriber 
information be published in a directory or be made available through 
a directory enquiries service. 
3 Unless the subscriber concerned explicitly authorises to the 
contrary, a directory publisher or directory enquiry agency must 
arrange a directory or operate a directory enquiry service so that: 
(a) [to search for a subscriber’s telephone number: 
(i) using a directory enquiry service, an enquirer is required to 
provide both the approximate name and approximate address of the 
subscriber being sought; 
(ii) using an electronic directory, a searcher is required to provide the 
approximate name of the subscriber being sought;] 
Note: Clause 3(a) was substituted by Amendment No 3. 
(b) where a subscriber’s name, address and telephone number is 
published or displayed in printed or electronic form it is ordered 
The public warning database should not 
be published or available in any insecure 
way that would lead it to be considered a 
directory for the purposes of this 
schedule. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
A subscriber may be un-listed 
 
 
 
Rarely needed for emergency 
management by this view but the 
necessary reverse search facility is 
excluded at (d) 
 
Consideration of the likely 
Commissioner’s ruling for reverse 
searches providing the street address 
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alphabetically by the name of the subscriber concerned; 
(c) where a subscriber’s name, address and telephone number is 
published or displayed in a directory it is not ordered to allow 
searches by address only; 
(d) subscriber information is not disclosed by way of a reverse 
search facility; 
(e) where a subscriber has expressed a preference for his or her 
name to appear in the directory in a certain form, the name is not 
published in any other form; 
Note: For example, subscribers may prefer to be listed using initials 
and surname, first name and surname, or the form of name by which 
they are most commonly known. The directory publisher may adopt 
policies as to acceptable entries (e.g. in relation to length, decency 
or to avoid confusion) and may refuse to publish nonconforming 
entries or names that differ entirely from the subscriber’s name. 
However, the agency may not publish a name in a form that differs 
from an expressed preference without the individual’s authorisation. 
(f) where a subscriber requests that only part of his or her address is 
included in a directory, his or her full address is not published. 
Note: Clause 3 is modelled upon clause 13 of the Code of Practice 
on Telecommunications Directory Information Covering the Fair 
Processing of Personal Data, UK, 1998. 
4 Clauses 3(a), (b), (c) and (d) do not apply in relation to a business 
subscriber. 
Note: The code applies only to telecommunications information 
about individuals and not to information solely about corporate 
bodies (such as companies and incorporated societies). The 
business subscribers to which this clause refers are therefore 
individuals who are business subscribers (e.g. sole traders or some 
professionals). 
27 
5 Notwithstanding clauses 3(e) and (f), a telecommunications 
agency is not required to seek explicit authorisation from an existing 
subscriber as to the form in which that subscriber’s name or address 
is to appear in a directory (including a reprinted or re-issued 
directory) or a directory enquiry service, but must act upon any 
request received. 
6 For the purposes of clause 5, an existing subscriber means a 
subscriber who has, [as at 1 April 2005], authorised a 
telecommunications agency to include his or her details in a 
published or compiled directory. 
Note: Clause 6 was amended by Amendment No 3. 
7 Where a telecommunications agency discloses subscriber 
information to a directory agency or a directory enquiry agency for 
the purposes of inclusion in a directory or directory enquiry service, 
the agency must do everything reasonably within its power to ensure 
that the directory publisher or directory enquiry agency will comply 
with the requirements of this code in relation to the publication or 
release of the subscriber information. 
8 Where an agency intends to seek explicit authorisation from a 
subscriber for a practice that would otherwise be contrary to clause 
3, it must: 
(a) notify the subscriber concerned directly of the agency’s policy 
and the available options before obtaining the authorisation; 
(b) advise the subscriber that it is not mandatory for the information 
to be disclosed in the directory or directory enquiry service; and 
(c) inform the subscriber that the authorisation may in the future be 
withdrawn and explain how this may be done. 
9 A telecommunications agency must take such steps as are, in the 
circumstances, reasonable to ensure that subscribers are aware of 
the agency’s practices in relation to directories and directory enquiry 
services and of the options available concerning the fact and form of 
publication, release or withholding of subscriber details in full or in 
without subscriber details is required. 
 
A key element of differentiation from 
usual directories is that the MCDEM 
database is a controlled directory 
compiled and used explicitly for actions 
required toprevent or lessen a serious 
and imminent threat to: 
(i) public health or public safety; or 
(ii) the life or health of the individual 
concerned or another individual; 
AND 
(h) that the disclosure is necessary to 
enable emergency services to respond to 
a potential threat to the life or health of 
the individual concerned or another 
individual; 
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part. 
[10. Without limiting clause 9, a telecommunications agency that 
publishes a directory on the Internet must: 
(a) take such steps as are, in the circumstances, reasonable to 
ensure that affected subscribers are aware that information about 
them is published in this manner and the implications for the 
accessibility of the information by other people (for example, any 
significant differences from the way in which the information may 
otherwise be made available in non-electronic directories); 
(b) promptly act to remove information relating to a subscriber from 
the Internet directory where that subscriber withdraws his or her 
authorisation for inclusion.] 
Note: Clause 10 was inserted by amendment No 3. 
SCHEDULE 3 
CALLER LINE INFORMATION PRESENTATION (CLIP) 
1 A telecommunications agency may disclose telecommunications 
information by means of CLIP, provided that: 
(a) subscribers are given the option to block the display of calling line 
identity on a per-line basis for both incoming and outgoing calls; 
(b) callers are given the means to block the display of calling line 
identity on a per-call basis for outbound calls; and 
(c) the agency takes reasonable steps to ensure that: 
(i) subscribers are made aware of the option to have per-line 
blocking; and  
(ii) users of the network are made aware of the ability to utilise per-
call blocking; 
(d) simple means are available for: 
(i) obtaining per-line blocking; 
(ii) exercising per-call blocking; and 
(iii) ascertaining whether an outgoing line is blocked; and 
(e) the option to obtain per-line blocking, and the means to obtain 
per-call blocking and to ascertain whether an outgoing line is 
blocked, are made available free of charge. 
Note: Blocking prevents the identification of the calling line to the 
ultimate recipient of 
the call. Some information will necessarily be transmitted to 
intermediaries (i.e. between 
network operators) as is allowed for in rule 11(1)(l)(iii). 
2 A telecommunications agency may override any block applied 
pursuant to clauses 
1(a) or (b) if the call is a 111 call. 
 
 
Clause 2 allows a telecommunications 
provider to override blocks.  Extension of 
this provision would enable block 
overrides when the caller is ‘911 - 
Emergency please turn on radio’ 
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Appendix 5e: SMS Anti-Spam Code 2007 
Section Comment 
4.2 Subject to Clause 4.4, Service Providers must take reasonable 
steps to: 
(a) inform Customers that everybody must comply with the Act and 
must not otherwise not engage in practices which would result in a 
breach of the Act; 
(b) inform Customers of the existence of any Code of Practice 
applicable to Spam; 
(c) inform Customers of any relevant changes or additions to 
legislation applicable to Spam; 
(d) warn Customers of the consequences of breaching a Service 
Provider’s Acceptable Use Policy in relation to the sending of 
Spam, including where applicable, the potential for 
termination/suspension of the Customer’s account; 
(e) advise Customers of: 
Internet Service Providers Spam Code of Practice Page 14 of 28 
Final – Version 1.00 – August 2007 
(i) methods of minimising the receipt of Spam; 
(ii) the availability of Spam Filters; 
(iii) their right to make complaints to any ISP regarding Spam that 
appears to come from that ISP or their customers; 
(iv) their right to make complaints to the Enforcement Agency about 
Spam and procedures by which such complaints can be made; 
(v) their right to make complaints to other bodies about Spam 
where the Content is in some way contrary to law; 
(f) inform Customers whether Electronic Messages addressed to 
them are subjected by the Service Provider to a Spam Filter by 
default, and provide a non-technical overview of the operations of 
that Spam Filter sufficient to assist customers in making informed 
choices; and 
(g) warn Customers that the use of a Spam Filter may result in 
legitimate emails being falsely classified as Spam (False Positives). 
MCDEM may need to warn the public that 
the use of spam filters may prevent the 
receipt of legitimate warning messages 
6.6 Service Providers must aim to minimise the risk of False 
Positives to the greatest possible extent. Service Providers should: 
6.6.1 provide contact details to which End Users or others can 
report False Positive incidents relating to that Service Provider 
6.6.2 consider the use of local Whitelists where whitelisted 
members are verified to comply with the Act 
6.6.3 avoid the use of blacklists and other Spam classification 
services that are known to have False Positive rates significantly 
higher than the industry norm 
MCDEM may need to ensure that the 
source address(es) of email and SMS 
messages are white listed and not 
blacklisted. 
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APPENDIX 6: System Descriptions  
 
Technology Fixed Line   Mobile Network    
Service Voice over IVR Fax Broadcasting Email SMS 
SMS with Geo-
Location 
Cell Broadcasting 
(Type 1) 
Cell Broadcasting 
(Type 2) 
Description 
Voice IVR 
messaging or 
autodialing is 
when numbers in 
a list are 
automatically 
dialled and a pre-
recorded message 
is played.  For 
example, a 36 
seconds long 
message, 
delivered to 100 
calls on one 
trunk/dialer would 
theoretically take 
one hour (3600 
seconds).  The 
number of trunks 
and length of the 
message 
determine the time 
to reach a target 
number of people. 
Works with banks 
of facsimile 
devices. Some 
providers claim to 
be able to send 
10,000s of 
facsimile pages 
per hour.  The 
same providers 
may also be 
senders of SMS 
and email 
messaging 
This service can 
be run in-house or 
using a web-
based service. 
Ability to prioritise 
SMS, by 
identifying channel 
the alert message 
is to be sent 
through and 
coordinating with 
government on the 
time the alert 
message will be 
sent. Ability to 
temporarily turn off 
the other channels 
while alert 
message is being 
sent. 
Hardware can be 
implemented 
within mobile 
networks to 
capture real time 
information on the 
location of mobile 
devices. This 
means that to 
enable a location 
based public alert 
message to be 
sent to mobiles, 
querying the core 
network is no 
longer required 
therefore reducing 
the time and load 
issues around 
SMS. 
Location based 
service technology 
for mobiles is not 
currently being 
used or available 
within New 
Zealand It is a 
critical component 
of an SMS based 
Type 1 Cell 
broadcasting is 
used in GSM 
networks to name 
cell sites. This 
allows users to 
see which cell site 
they are 
connected to.  
Identifier text 
appears on the top 
of the mobile’s 
home screen e.g. 
“Wellington CBD”. 
Character limits 
vary from 11 to 36 
depending on the 
age of the mobile 
device. Some 
phones do not 
possess this 
functionality and 
some require it to 
be activated on 
their phones. 
Changes do not 
generate alert 
tones. The text 
can easily be 
Cell Broadcasting 
is a point to multi-
point messaging 
system that is an 
existing function of 
most modern 
digital mobile 
phone systems, 
such as GSM, 
UMTS and CDMA. 
It works through 
users pre-
selecting on their 
device to have the 
cell broadcasting 
function switched 
on for particular 
channels. Network 
cell sites can be 
activated to send 
a broadcast 
message to all 
devices currently 
within its coverage 
area. The mobile 
network 
possesses real 
time information 
on the location of 
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non-opt in alerting 
solution. Limited 
commercial 
availability 
internationally. 
Due to commercial 
imperatives 
location based 
service technology 
is been advancing. 
Location based 
technology, 
termed “spatial 
triggering” suitable 
for mass public 
alerting is ready 
for 
implementation, 
however it has yet 
to be deployed for 
public alerting 
purposes. 
The person to 
person version of 
the product has 
been in use for 
some years in 
Australia, 
providing instant 
information to 
emergency 
services on the 
location of 
emergency calls 
placed on mobile 
calls. 
changed by the 
carriers therefore 
could be changed 
to signal a CDEM 
emergency is in 
place in a 
particular area. 
all devices 
connected to it  
Messages can 
reach millions of 
subscribers within 
in minutes.  Can 
support up to 1350 
characters (90-
180 is 
recommended). 
For mass alerting 
the recipient 
receives an SMS 
like text message 
directly onto the 
screen of their 
phone, sometimes 
called flash 
messaging, which 
can also be set to 
ring and vibrate. 
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Some 
independent 
organisations 
have recognised 
the need for 
location based 
technology in 
public alerting and 
developed 
independent 
systems to enable 
it. Unified 
Messaging 
Systems (UMS) of 
Norway is one 
such organisation. 
Limits and 
Vulnerabilities 
Capacity is limited 
by trunks and 
message length 
Fax usage is 
largely limited to 
businesses  
Ability to identify 
mobile users in an 
area is limited. 
CDMA networks 
cannot do this and 
GSM networks 
may take hours to 
run the relevant 
queries 
(depending on 
size of target area) 
and increases 
network loading. 
Message length 
limited to 160 
characters 
Not yet available 
in New Zealand 
Limited to 11-36 
characters.  
Available to a 
proportion of 
mobile users. 
May not be 
noticed by user of 
mobile device 
Not suitable for 
visually impaired 
If the user does 
not save the 
message they 
may not be able to 
retrieve it again 
Limited to devices 
that support this 
functionality and to 
those subscribed 
to the appropriate 
channels. 
The ITU is 
currently 
performing work to 
ensure 
international 
standardisation of 
these channel 
addresses. New 
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Zealand 
deployment would 
need to ensure 
internationally 
consistent 
standards are 
developed and 
implemented 
across the 
national carriers. 
The elderly may 
be particularly less 
inclined to do this 
due to their lack of 
familiarity with 
device technology.   
As a device 
function, users 
can not be 
automatically 
connected to this 
service at a 
network layer. 
Strengths 
Available in NZ 
nationally now 
Ability to 
distinguish 
between live 
response and 
answer machines.  
Less likely to be 
ignored than 
moblie 
technologies. 
Message length 
Available in NZ 
nationally now 
Available in NZ 
nationally now  
Message length 
not limited (?) 
Available in NZ 
nationally now  
Sensitive to power 
loss. Wide spread 
prolonged power 
outage i.e. over 
24-48 hours has 
potential to 
severely degrade 
coverage.  
Potential for delay 
between sending 
Overcomes 
loading and delay 
issues in sending 
SMS to mobile 
devices in target 
areas 
Available in NZ 
nationally now  
Messages can be 
quickly generated 
for target areas 
with no loading 
issues 
Could be deployed 
in New Zealand 
now 
Messages do not 
present load 
congestion issues 
and is purported to 
work in a fully 
congested 
network  
Different channels 
can be set to 
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not limited and receiving due 
to ability to turn 
off, and ignore 
incoming 
messages.  
Aged do not like 
text messages.  
Public alerting opt 
in solutions 
require alternate 
means to opt in. 
Mobile device text 
alerts may not 
wake sleeping 
target receivers. 
communicate 
different 
emergency 
information ie.g. 
different 
languages, deliver 
different 
messages to first 
responders 
Additional 
Features 
Autodialing may 
be accompanied 
by voice to text or 
text to voice 
conversion to suit 
the requirements 
of the receiver e.g. 
the blind or deaf   
Can cater for non-
English speakers, 
however 
messages would 
likely be pre-
programmed to 
ensure speed of 
message delivery.  
Not designed for 
vision impaired, 
however text to 
voice conversion 
products are 
available to end 
users. If users 
were required to 
opt-in and an 
integrated system 
was selected 
users could elect   
Geo-scalable from 
a single cell site 
coverage area to a 
whole country. 
Accommodates 
disability related 
technology 
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to have a voice 
message sent to 
their mobile as an 
alternative 
Recommendation 
Most useful for 
early warning of 
small target areas 
Most useful for 
business areas 
during work hours  
Most useful in 
initial stages of an 
event when a 
network is not 
congested and 
target audience is 
not likely to be 
sleeping. However 
if paired with 
congestion control 
mechanisms it 
may be suitable in 
some events. 
When available it 
will be suitable for 
sending messages 
to targeted areas. 
Useful alerting 
supplement for 
rapid deployment 
of very short 
messages. 
Cell broadcasting 
is an attractive 
public alerting 
solution given its 
delivery speed 
and ability to 
continue working 
in a congested 
network 
environment. 
Examples / 
References    Mobile Network 
http://www.ericsso
n.com/technology/
positioning_metho
ds/spatial_triggers
.shtml  
In Korea cell 
broadcasting is 
used for 
distribution of 
supermarket 
discount vouchers 
    SMS    
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APPENDIX 7: Mobile Telecommunication Market 
 
New Zealand currently has two primary providers of mobile services, Telecom New Zealand 
and Vodafone NZ. Mobile market penetration is very high in New Zealand at over 80%. 
Currently the providers are relatively evenly split in terms of market share with Vodafone 
having 53% (2.4 million customers) and Telecom having 47% (2.2 million) as of first quarter 
results in 2008. Telstraclear signed an agreement with Telecom in August 2007 launching its 
own mobile service in November 2007, providing a unique range of mobile services, bundles 
and prices via the Telecom network initially with business customers.  Consumer customer 
services were launched in August 2008. 
Recent legislation changes have required the incumbent mobile providers to provide both 
roaming access to new network providers whilst they build their own network and co-location 
of cell sites with the new providers.  NZ Communications is expected to be the first new 
mobile provider with an initial proposed launch date of end of 2008, which has recently been 
moved to late 20091.   
Vodafone NZ currently runs a GSM based mobile network, whereas Telecom uses a CDMA 
network. Vodafone is in the process of rolling out W-CDMA technology through its 3G sites.  
Telecom is also going through a technical deployment of a new mobile network based on 
UMTS/W-CDMA technology with a GSM edge, 2G coverage will be fully implemented at the 
proposed launch date, end of 2008 with 3G being rolled out to all major cities over the next 
two to three years.   
 
 
                                                
1 Drinnan, J. 2008. Expanded Mobile hits snag. NZ Herald August 19,2008. 
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APPENDIX 8: Mobile Network Configuration Diagrams 
 
The diagrams below show a high level representation of the GSM and CDMA network 
configurations. 
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APPENDIX 9: Global Positioning Systems and Public Alerting 
 
"A Satellite-Based Communication Channel for the Reliable Distribution of Early Warning 
Messages”2 discusses the use of Satellite-Based Augmentation Systems (SBAS) to 
communicate alerts using existing augmentation infrastructure within the Global Positioning 
System (GPS). SBAS systems are active over Europe (European Geostationary Navigation 
Overlay Service - EGNOS), North America (Wide Area Augmentation System - WAAS), and 
Japan (Multi-functional Satellite Augmentation System - MSAS).  
Design principles behind SBAS are conducive to alerting due to the following characteristics 
as outlined by Plag et al: 
• Institutionally controlled systems 
• Secure 
• Operated for safety of life applications 
• Guarantee adequate message broadcast 
• Integrity of messages 
• Confirmation of transmission 
None of the current or planned SBAS are or will be publicly available over New Zealand. 
OmniStar provides a commercial service, however only expensive survey-provision GPS 
equipment appears to support this subscription-based service and New Zealand coverage is 
not comprehensive. 
It would be prohibitively expensive for New Zealand to invest in a system on our own due to 
the cost of launching a geosynchronous satellite that is required to broadcast the SBAS 
signal; however it may be possible to implement on a regional basis - such as the South 
Pacific or Oceania. The benefits of a SBAS to the region would include more than just 
alerting, as it would provide improved accuracy for navigation and other economic benefits. 
                                                
2 Mathur, A. R., Ventura-Traveset, J., Montefusco, C., Toran, F., Plag, H.-P., Ruiz, L., Stojkovic, I., & Levy, J. 
C., 2006. Provision of emergency communciation messages through SBAS: the ESA ALIVE concept, in  ION 
GNSS 2005 Proceedings, Long Beach, California, 2969-2975, Institute of Navigation, USA (pdf). From 
http://geodesy.unr.edu/hanspeterplag/publications/ Accessed 20081003 
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APPENDIX 10: Interviewees 
 
Information was received from the following people as part of the project:
A3M AG - Tsunami Institute, 
Deutschland (www.tsunami-
alarm-system.com) 
Marcel Brandt (Head of Marketing) 
CEASA UK (www.ceasa-int.org) 
Mark Wood (Hon. Sec.) 
Cellcast Technologies US 
(www.cellcastcorp.com) 
Paul Klein (C.E.O) 
Kevin Preston (C.I.O.) 
Ericsson Australia 
Patrick Quin (Account Manager) 
FESA (www.fesa.wa.gov.au) 
Stephen Johnston (Manager Operational 
Development) 
Gen-i 
Judson Croft 
Kordia 
Alan Mordecai (Manager Infrastructure 
and Property Group) 
Rocom NZ 
Richard Guy (Director) 
John Nowak 
Telecom NZ 
Brian Potter (Risk Manager) 
Brigitte Theuma (Business Continuity 
Manager) 
Dean Schmidt (Head of Government 
Relations and Community Relations)  
Andrew Bowater (Adviser, Government 
and Community Relations)  
Presan da Silva (Enterprise Architect ) 
Grant Cromby (Telecom Mobile (W-
CDMA)) 
Gavin Dudley (Sales Manager) 
Malcolm Shore (Technology Strategist) 
Telstra 
Mark Stevens (Senior Sales Specialist) 
TelstraClear 
Dilshan Perrera (Principal Systems 
Architect) 
Robert Visscher (Account Manager) 
UMS Norway 
Morten Gustavsen (Managing Director) 
Kjell Heen 
Vodafone Australia 
Claudine Everitt (BCM Manager) 
Vodafone Italy  
Marilena Tardito (ICT Security & Privacy) 
Vodafone NZ 
George Bromell (Senior Engineer, Value 
Added Services) 
Peter Carr (BCM Manager) 
Claire Green (Sales Operations Manager) 
Mandos Mitchinson (Operations Manager 
– Fixed Line and Broadband) 
Callum O’Neill (Core Services) 
Alan Roberts (Service Enablers) 
Murray Smith (Roaming Specialist) 
Brandon Wong 
Vector Communications 
Kevin Oswin 
Vodafone UK 
Amanda Chandler (Data Protection and 
Business Continuity Manager)
